Files
Mahipal 6972fe933e docs(skills): rewrite container-security descriptions to a uniform standard
All 33 container-security skills now carry what it does, an explicit
"Use when" trigger, keywords, and a negative trigger naming the nearest
neighbour. Six collision clusters resolved by differentiating scope
rather than merging, so no skill is removed:

- kube-bench: running the tool vs interpreting findings into an audit
- Calico: portable upstream NetworkPolicy vs Calico-as-CNI vs Calico-only
  CRDs (GlobalNetworkPolicy, HostEndpoint, DNS egress)
- Falco: deploying and operating it vs authoring escape rules
- container escape: tool-agnostic runtime signals vs Falco rule syntax vs
  static posture audit vs offensive breakout
- Trivy: all-target platform and operator vs single-image scan
- Docker: images and Dockerfiles vs daemon.json vs the CIS audit script

Also replaces the templated "When to Use" boilerplate in these files,
including bullets that only restated the skill's own name.

Worst pair (Pod Security Standards vs Pod Security Admission) drops from
0.77 cosine to below the 0.45 threshold. Repo-wide: colliding pairs
60 -> 56, skills involved 105 -> 94.
2026-08-23 17:15:30 +02:00

222 lines
6.6 KiB
Markdown

---
name: implementing-container-image-minimal-base-with-distroless
description: >-
Reduces container attack surface by building application images on Google distroless base
images that ship only the application runtime - no shell, package manager, or OS utilities -
using multi-stage build patterns plus debugging and scanning techniques adapted to
distroless. Use when hardening container images, cutting attack surface in a container
architecture, or answering an assessment finding about bloated base images. Keywords:
distroless, multi-stage build, no shell, nonroot tag, debug image, scratch, attack surface.
Do not use for scanning an image for known CVEs - use scanning-docker-images-with-trivy.
domain: cybersecurity
subdomain: container-security
tags:
- distroless
- container-images
- minimal-base
- attack-surface
- docker
- security-hardening
- supply-chain
- kubernetes
version: '1.0'
author: mahipal
license: Apache-2.0
nist_csf:
- PR.PS-01
- PR.IR-01
- ID.AM-08
- DE.CM-01
mitre_attack:
- T1610
- T1611
- T1609
- T1525
- T1195
---
# Implementing Container Image Minimal Base with Distroless
## Overview
Google distroless images contain only your application and its runtime dependencies, without package managers, shells, or other programs found in standard Linux distributions. By eliminating unnecessary OS components, distroless images achieve up to 95% reduction in attack surface compared to traditional base images like ubuntu or debian. Major projects including Kubernetes itself, Knative, and Tekton use distroless images in production. As of 2025, Docker also offers Hardened Images (DHI) as an open-source alternative for minimal container bases.
## When to Use
- When deploying or configuring implementing container image minimal base with distroless capabilities in your environment
- When establishing security controls aligned to compliance requirements
- When building or improving security architecture for this domain
- When conducting security assessments that require this implementation
## Prerequisites
- Docker 20.10+ or compatible container build tool (Buildah, Kaniko)
- Multi-stage Dockerfile knowledge
- Application compiled as a static binary or with runtime bundled
- Container registry for image storage
## Available Distroless Images
| Image | Use Case | Size |
|-------|----------|------|
| `gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12` | Statically compiled binaries (Go, Rust) | ~2MB |
| `gcr.io/distroless/base-debian12` | Dynamically linked binaries needing glibc | ~20MB |
| `gcr.io/distroless/cc-debian12` | C/C++ applications needing libstdc++ | ~25MB |
| `gcr.io/distroless/java21-debian12` | Java 21 applications | ~220MB |
| `gcr.io/distroless/python3-debian12` | Python 3 applications | ~50MB |
| `gcr.io/distroless/nodejs22-debian12` | Node.js 22 applications | ~130MB |
## Multi-Stage Build Patterns
### Go Application
```dockerfile
# Build stage
FROM golang:1.22-bookworm AS builder
WORKDIR /app
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download
COPY . .
RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=linux go build -ldflags="-s -w" -o /server ./cmd/server
# Runtime stage - static distroless
FROM gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12:nonroot
COPY --from=builder /server /server
USER nonroot:nonroot
ENTRYPOINT ["/server"]
```
### Java Application
```dockerfile
# Build stage
FROM maven:3.9-eclipse-temurin-21 AS builder
WORKDIR /app
COPY pom.xml .
RUN mvn dependency:go-offline
COPY src ./src
RUN mvn package -DskipTests
# Runtime stage - Java distroless
FROM gcr.io/distroless/java21-debian12:nonroot
COPY --from=builder /app/target/app.jar /app.jar
USER nonroot:nonroot
ENTRYPOINT ["java", "-jar", "/app.jar"]
```
### Python Application
```dockerfile
# Build stage
FROM python:3.12-bookworm AS builder
WORKDIR /app
COPY requirements.txt .
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir --target=/deps -r requirements.txt
COPY . .
# Runtime stage - Python distroless
FROM gcr.io/distroless/python3-debian12:nonroot
WORKDIR /app
COPY --from=builder /deps /deps
COPY --from=builder /app /app
ENV PYTHONPATH=/deps
USER nonroot:nonroot
ENTRYPOINT ["python3", "/app/main.py"]
```
### Node.js Application
```dockerfile
# Build stage
FROM node:22-bookworm AS builder
WORKDIR /app
COPY package*.json ./
RUN npm ci --production
COPY . .
# Runtime stage - Node distroless
FROM gcr.io/distroless/nodejs22-debian12:nonroot
WORKDIR /app
COPY --from=builder /app .
USER nonroot:nonroot
CMD ["server.js"]
```
## Security Benefits
### Attack Surface Comparison
| Component | Ubuntu | Alpine | Distroless |
|-----------|--------|--------|-----------|
| Shell (bash/sh) | Yes | Yes | No |
| Package manager | apt | apk | No |
| coreutils | Full | BusyBox | No |
| curl/wget | Yes | Yes | No |
| User management | Yes | Yes | No |
| Known CVEs (typical) | 50-200+ | 5-20 | 0-5 |
| Image size (base) | ~77MB | ~7MB | ~2-20MB |
### Security Implications
- **No shell**: Attackers cannot exec into containers to run commands
- **No package manager**: Cannot install additional tools or malware
- **No coreutils**: No `cat`, `ls`, `find`, `curl` for reconnaissance
- **Minimal CVEs**: Fewer packages means fewer vulnerabilities to patch
- **Non-root by default**: `:nonroot` tag runs as UID 65534
## Debugging Distroless Containers
Since distroless has no shell, use these techniques for debugging:
### Debug Image Variant
```dockerfile
# Use debug variant in non-production environments only
FROM gcr.io/distroless/base-debian12:debug
# Includes busybox shell at /busybox/sh
```
```bash
# Exec into debug variant
kubectl exec -it pod-name -- /busybox/sh
```
### Ephemeral Debug Containers (Kubernetes 1.25+)
```bash
# Attach a debug container with full tooling
kubectl debug -it pod-name --image=busybox:1.36 --target=app-container
```
### Crane/Dive for Image Inspection
```bash
# Inspect image layers without running
crane export gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12 - | tar -tf - | head -50
# Analyze image layers
dive gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12
```
## Image Scanning Results
Typical vulnerability comparison using Trivy:
```bash
# Scan Ubuntu-based image
trivy image myapp:ubuntu
# Result: 47 vulnerabilities (3 CRITICAL, 12 HIGH)
# Scan Distroless-based image
trivy image myapp:distroless
# Result: 2 vulnerabilities (0 CRITICAL, 0 HIGH)
```
## References
- [GoogleContainerTools/distroless GitHub](https://github.com/GoogleContainerTools/distroless)
- [Distroless Images - Docker Documentation](https://docs.docker.com/dhi/core-concepts/distroless/)
- [Alpine, Distroless, or Scratch? - Google Cloud](https://medium.com/google-cloud/alpine-distroless-or-scratch-caac35250e0b)
- [Docker Hardened Images](https://www.infoq.com/news/2025/12/docker-hardened-images/)