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mukul975
79 lines
3.1 KiB
Markdown
79 lines
3.1 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: detecting-email-forwarding-rules-attack
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description: Detect malicious email forwarding rules created by adversaries to maintain persistent access to email communications for intelligence collection and BEC attacks.
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domain: cybersecurity
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subdomain: threat-hunting
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tags: [threat-hunting, mitre-attack, email-forwarding, persistence, bec, t1114, proactive-detection]
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version: "1.0"
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author: mahipal
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license: Apache-2.0
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---
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# Detecting Email Forwarding Rules Attack
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## When to Use
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- When proactively hunting for indicators of detecting email forwarding rules attack in the environment
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- After threat intelligence indicates active campaigns using these techniques
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- During incident response to scope compromise related to these techniques
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- When EDR or SIEM alerts trigger on related indicators
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- During periodic security assessments and purple team exercises
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## Prerequisites
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- EDR platform with process and network telemetry (CrowdStrike, MDE, SentinelOne)
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- SIEM with relevant log data ingested (Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel)
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- Sysmon deployed with comprehensive configuration
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- Windows Security Event Log forwarding enabled
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- Threat intelligence feeds for IOC correlation
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## Workflow
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1. **Formulate Hypothesis**: Define a testable hypothesis based on threat intelligence or ATT&CK gap analysis.
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2. **Identify Data Sources**: Determine which logs and telemetry are needed to validate or refute the hypothesis.
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3. **Execute Queries**: Run detection queries against SIEM and EDR platforms to collect relevant events.
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4. **Analyze Results**: Examine query results for anomalies, correlating across multiple data sources.
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5. **Validate Findings**: Distinguish true positives from false positives through contextual analysis.
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6. **Correlate Activity**: Link findings to broader attack chains and threat actor TTPs.
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7. **Document and Report**: Record findings, update detection rules, and recommend response actions.
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## Key Concepts
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| Concept | Description |
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|---------|-------------|
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| T1114.003 | Email Forwarding Rule |
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| T1114.002 | Remote Email Collection |
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| T1098.002 | Additional Email Delegate Permissions |
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## Tools & Systems
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| Tool | Purpose |
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|------|---------|
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| CrowdStrike Falcon | EDR telemetry and threat detection |
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| Microsoft Defender for Endpoint | Advanced hunting with KQL |
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| Splunk Enterprise | SIEM log analysis with SPL queries |
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| Elastic Security | Detection rules and investigation timeline |
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| Sysmon | Detailed Windows event monitoring |
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| Velociraptor | Endpoint artifact collection and hunting |
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| Sigma Rules | Cross-platform detection rule format |
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## Common Scenarios
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1. **Scenario 1**: BEC actor creating forwarding rule to external email
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2. **Scenario 2**: Compromised account with rule deleting security alerts
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3. **Scenario 3**: Inbox rule forwarding CEO emails to attacker mailbox
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4. **Scenario 4**: OAuth app abuse creating transport rules for data collection
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## Output Format
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```
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Hunt ID: TH-DETECT-[DATE]-[SEQ]
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Technique: T1114.003
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Host: [Hostname]
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User: [Account context]
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Evidence: [Log entries, process trees, network data]
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Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
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Confidence: [High/Medium/Low]
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Recommended Action: [Containment, investigation, monitoring]
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```
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