mirror of
https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.git
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187 lines
7.9 KiB
Markdown
187 lines
7.9 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: containing-active-security-breach
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description: Rapidly contain an active security breach by isolating compromised systems, blocking attacker communications, and preserving evidence while minimizing business disruption.
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domain: cybersecurity
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subdomain: incident-response
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tags: [incident-response, containment, breach-response, network-isolation, dfir]
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version: "1.0"
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author: mahipal
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license: Apache-2.0
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---
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# Containing an Active Security Breach
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## When to Use
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- Active unauthorized access detected on network or systems
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- IDS/IPS alerts indicate ongoing exploitation or data exfiltration
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- SOC analysts confirm a true positive security incident requiring immediate containment
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- Lateral movement or privilege escalation observed in real time
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- Ransomware encryption activity detected before full deployment
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## Prerequisites
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- Incident Response Plan with defined containment procedures
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- Network access to firewalls, switches, and endpoint management consoles
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- EDR/XDR platform deployed across endpoints (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint)
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- SIEM access with real-time log correlation (Splunk, Elastic, QRadar)
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- Pre-approved authority to isolate systems (documented in IR plan)
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- Forensic imaging tools ready for evidence preservation
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## Workflow
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### Step 1: Validate and Classify the Incident
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```bash
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# Check SIEM for correlated alerts - Splunk example
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index=security sourcetype=ids_alerts severity=critical
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| stats count by src_ip, dest_ip, signature
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| where count > 5
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| sort -count
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# Verify endpoint alerts via CrowdStrike Falcon API
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curl -X GET "https://api.crowdstrike.com/detects/queries/detects/v1?filter=status:'new'+max_severity_displayname:'Critical'" \
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-H "Authorization: Bearer $FALCON_TOKEN"
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```
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### Step 2: Identify Scope of Compromise
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```bash
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# Identify all systems communicating with attacker C2
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# Using Zeek connection logs
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cat conn.log | zeek-cut id.orig_h id.resp_h id.resp_p duration orig_bytes resp_bytes \
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| awk '$3 == 443 && $5 > 1000000' | sort -t$'\t' -k5 -rn | head -20
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# Check for lateral movement in Windows Event Logs
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wevtutil qe Security /q:"*[System[(EventID=4624)] and EventData[Data[@Name='LogonType']='3']]" /f:text /c:50
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# Query Active Directory for recent authentication anomalies
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Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security';ID=4625} -MaxEvents 100 |
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Group-Object -Property {$_.Properties[5].Value} | Sort-Object Count -Descending
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```
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### Step 3: Execute Network Containment
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```bash
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# Block attacker IP at perimeter firewall (Palo Alto example)
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set cli pager off
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configure
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set rulebase security rules emergency-block from any to any source [attacker_ip] action deny
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set rulebase security rules emergency-block from any to any destination [attacker_ip] action deny
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commit force
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# Isolate compromised VLAN at switch level (Cisco)
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configure terminal
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interface vlan 100
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shutdown
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end
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write memory
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# Block C2 domains at DNS level
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# Add to DNS sinkhole or RPZ
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echo "attacker-c2-domain.com CNAME ." >> /etc/bind/rpz.local
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rndc reload
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```
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### Step 4: Isolate Compromised Endpoints
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```bash
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# CrowdStrike - Network contain host via API
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curl -X POST "https://api.crowdstrike.com/devices/entities/devices-actions/v2?action_name=contain" \
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-H "Authorization: Bearer $FALCON_TOKEN" \
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-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
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-d '{"ids": ["device_id_1", "device_id_2"]}'
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# Microsoft Defender for Endpoint - Isolate machine
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curl -X POST "https://api.securitycenter.microsoft.com/api/machines/{machineId}/isolate" \
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-H "Authorization: Bearer $MDE_TOKEN" \
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-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
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-d '{"Comment": "IR-2024-001: Active breach containment", "IsolationType": "Full"}'
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# SentinelOne - Disconnect from network
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curl -X POST "https://usea1.sentinelone.net/web/api/v2.1/agents/actions/disconnect" \
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-H "Authorization: ApiToken $S1_TOKEN" \
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-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
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-d '{"filter": {"ids": ["agent_id"]}, "data": {}}'
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```
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### Step 5: Preserve Volatile Evidence Before Full Isolation
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```bash
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# Capture live memory from compromised Windows host
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winpmem_mini_x64.exe memdump_hostname_$(date +%Y%m%d).raw
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# Capture network connections and running processes
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netstat -anob > netstat_capture_$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M).txt
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tasklist /V /FO CSV > process_list_$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M).csv
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wmic process list full > process_detail_$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M).txt
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# Linux volatile evidence collection
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dd if=/proc/kcore of=/mnt/forensics/memory_$(hostname)_$(date +%Y%m%d).raw bs=1M
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ss -tulnp > /mnt/forensics/network_$(hostname).txt
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ps auxwwf > /mnt/forensics/processes_$(hostname).txt
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```
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### Step 6: Disable Compromised Accounts
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```bash
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# Disable compromised Active Directory accounts
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Import-Module ActiveDirectory
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Disable-ADAccount -Identity "compromised_user"
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Set-ADUser -Identity "compromised_user" -Description "Disabled - IR-2024-001 $(Get-Date)"
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# Revoke all active sessions
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Revoke-AzureADUserAllRefreshToken -ObjectId "user_object_id"
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# Reset service account credentials
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Set-ADAccountPassword -Identity "svc_compromised" -Reset -NewPassword (ConvertTo-SecureString "TempP@ss$(Get-Random)" -AsPlainText -Force)
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```
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### Step 7: Validate Containment Effectiveness
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```bash
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# Verify no active C2 communications
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tcpdump -i eth0 host attacker_ip -c 100 -w verification_capture.pcap
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# Check for new lateral movement attempts
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index=security sourcetype=wineventlog EventCode=4624 LogonType=3
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earliest=-15m
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| stats count by src_ip, dest_ip
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| where src_ip IN ("compromised_hosts")
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# Validate endpoint isolation status
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curl -X GET "https://api.crowdstrike.com/devices/entities/devices/v2?ids=device_id" \
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-H "Authorization: Bearer $FALCON_TOKEN" | jq '.resources[].status'
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```
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## Key Concepts
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| Concept | Description |
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|---------|-------------|
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| Short-term Containment | Immediate actions to stop active damage (network isolation, account disable) |
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| Long-term Containment | Sustainable measures while investigation continues (VLAN segmentation, enhanced monitoring) |
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| Evidence Preservation | Capturing volatile data before containment actions destroy forensic artifacts |
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| Blast Radius | Total scope of systems, accounts, and data affected by the breach |
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| Containment Boundary | Network and logical perimeter established to prevent further spread |
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| Kill Chain Disruption | Breaking the attacker's operational chain at the earliest possible stage |
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| Business Continuity | Maintaining critical operations while containing the threat |
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## Tools & Systems
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| Tool | Purpose |
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|------|---------|
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| CrowdStrike Falcon | Endpoint detection, network containment of hosts |
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| Microsoft Defender for Endpoint | Endpoint isolation and automated investigation |
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| Palo Alto NGFW | Perimeter firewall rules for IP/domain blocking |
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| Splunk/Elastic SIEM | Real-time alert correlation and scope analysis |
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| Zeek (Bro) | Network traffic analysis for C2 identification |
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| Velociraptor | Remote forensic collection and endpoint querying |
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| Active Directory | Account management and authentication control |
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## Common Scenarios
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1. **Ransomware Pre-Encryption**: Attacker has deployed ransomware binary but encryption hasn't started. Isolate patient zero, block C2, and prevent lateral deployment.
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2. **Active Data Exfiltration**: Data is being exfiltrated to external server. Block egress to C2, capture network evidence, isolate affected systems.
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3. **Compromised Domain Controller**: Attacker has DC access. Isolate DC from network, reset KRBTGT twice, rotate all privileged credentials.
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4. **Supply Chain Compromise**: Malicious update deployed across environment. Block update server, isolate systems that received the update, assess scope.
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5. **Insider Threat - Active Exfil**: Employee actively copying sensitive data. Disable account, block USB access, preserve evidence chain.
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## Output Format
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- Containment action log with timestamps (who, what, when)
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- Network isolation verification report
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- List of compromised/isolated systems with justification
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- Evidence preservation checksums and chain of custody records
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- Containment effectiveness validation results
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- Stakeholder notification with current status and next steps
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