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Demand-driven expansion targeting the fastest-growing 2025-2026 threat and
skills categories (ISC2/WEF/CrowdStrike/Mandiant signals):
- AI Security (NEW domain, 12 skills): LLM red-teaming with garak/PyRIT,
prompt injection (direct/indirect/RAG), MCP tool-poisoning, agentic tool
invocation, guardrails, model/data poisoning, system-prompt leakage,
embedding/vector weaknesses, model extraction, continuous red-teaming
- Supply Chain Security (NEW domain, 5 skills): SBOMs, dependency confusion,
malicious-npm triage, typosquatting, SLSA/Sigstore provenance
- Hardware & Firmware Security (NEW domain, 4 skills): CHIPSEC/UEFI audit,
Secure Boot bypass, TPM measured-boot attestation, ESP bootkit hunting
- Identity (10): Entra ID/ROADtools, GraphRunner, AADInternals, ADCS/Certipy,
shadow credentials, coercion, BloodHound CE, device-code phishing, SSO abuse
- Cloud-native (8): Stratus, Pacu, CloudFox, container escape, K8s RBAC,
Falco, Trivy, kube-bench
- Offensive C2 (6): Sliver, Havoc, NetExec, DPAPI, NTLM relay ESC8, redirectors
- DFIR (6): Hayabusa, Chainsaw, KAPE, Velociraptor, EZ Tools, Plaso
- Backfill (4): OpenCTI, MISP, honeytokens, post-quantum crypto migration
Each skill follows the repo taxonomy (SKILL.md + references/{standards,api-reference}.md
+ scripts/agent.py + LICENSE), with researched real tool commands (no placeholders),
complete frontmatter, and ATT&CK/ATLAS + NIST CSF mappings. Updates README domain
table, skill count, and index.json.
29 lines
1.4 KiB
Markdown
29 lines
1.4 KiB
Markdown
# Standards and Framework Mapping — Orchestrating LLM Attacks with PyRIT
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## MITRE ATLAS (Adversarial Threat Landscape for AI Systems)
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| ID | Name | Rationale |
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|----|------|-----------|
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| AML.T0051 | LLM Prompt Injection | PyRIT orchestrators inject crafted instructions across conversation turns to make the target act against its intended constraints. |
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| AML.T0054 | LLM Jailbreak | Crescendo and TAP iteratively defeat safety guardrails; the scorer confirms the moment restrictions are bypassed. |
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Reference: https://atlas.mitre.org/
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## NIST AI Risk Management Framework (AI RMF 1.0)
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| ID | Subcategory | Rationale |
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|----|-------------|-----------|
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| MEASURE-2.7 | AI system security and resilience are evaluated and documented | PyRIT yields repeatable, scorer-graded measurements of an LLM's resistance to multi-turn adversarial pressure, evidencing this subcategory. |
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Reference: https://www.nist.gov/itl/ai-risk-management-framework
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## OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications (cross-reference)
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| OWASP ID | Risk | PyRIT relevance |
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|----------|------|-----------------|
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| LLM01:2025 | Prompt Injection | RedTeaming/Crescendo/TAP orchestrators automate injection. |
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| LLM02:2025 | Sensitive Information Disclosure | Objective scorers can target data/secret leakage. |
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| LLM07:2025 | System Prompt Leakage | Objectives can be set to extract the system prompt. |
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Reference: https://genai.owasp.org/
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