mirror of
https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.git
synced 2026-09-02 06:30:50 +03:00
Mahipal
2545b2d3d5
Deterministic audit against vendored MITRE/NIST oracles (ATT&CK v19.1, ATLAS 2026.07, NIST CSF 2.0, D3FEND v1.4.0) found and fixed: - 27 wrong-framework leaks on 12 AI-security skills: ATLAS AML.* IDs were under `mitre_attack` (-> `atlas_techniques`) and AI-RMF GOVERN/MEASURE IDs under `nist_csf` (-> `nist_ai_rmf`). - RS.AN-01 -> RS.AN-03 on 37 forensics/incident-analysis skills (CSF 1.1 ID retired in CSF 2.0; RS.AN-03 is the incident-analysis successor). - PR.DS-06 -> PR.DS-01 on the SLSA/Sigstore provenance skill (CSF 1.1 ID absorbed into PR.DS-01 in CSF 2.0; body prose updated too). - AML.T0104 -> AML.T0010 on 3 software-supply-chain skills (T0104 is "Publish Poisoned AI Agent Tool" -- wrong topic; T0010 "AI Supply Chain Compromise" is correct). CSF/ATLAS replacements verified against NIST CSWP.29, the official CSF 1.1->2.0 transition workbook, and mitre-atlas/atlas-data. Framework-ID gate: 0 defects. Schema: 817/817 pass.
91 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
91 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
---
|
|
name: detecting-supply-chain-attacks-in-ci-cd
|
|
description: 'Scans GitHub Actions workflows and CI/CD pipeline configurations for
|
|
supply chain attack vectors including unpinned actions, script injection via expressions,
|
|
dependency confusion, and secrets exposure. Uses PyGithub and YAML parsing for automated
|
|
audit. Use when hardening CI/CD pipelines or investigating compromised build systems.
|
|
|
|
'
|
|
domain: cybersecurity
|
|
subdomain: security-operations
|
|
tags:
|
|
- supply-chain-security
|
|
- ci-cd-security
|
|
- github-actions
|
|
- pipeline-security
|
|
- dependency-pinning
|
|
- devsecops
|
|
version: '1.0'
|
|
author: mahipal
|
|
license: Apache-2.0
|
|
atlas_techniques:
|
|
- AML.T0010
|
|
nist_ai_rmf:
|
|
- GOVERN-5.2
|
|
- MAP-1.6
|
|
- MANAGE-2.2
|
|
nist_csf:
|
|
- DE.CM-01
|
|
- RS.MA-01
|
|
- GV.OV-01
|
|
- DE.AE-02
|
|
mitre_attack:
|
|
- T1195.002
|
|
- T1195.001
|
|
- T1199
|
|
- T1554
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
# Detecting Supply Chain Attacks in CI/CD
|
|
|
|
|
|
## When to Use
|
|
|
|
- When investigating security incidents that require detecting supply chain attacks in ci cd
|
|
- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
|
|
- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
|
|
- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
|
|
|
|
## Prerequisites
|
|
|
|
- Familiarity with security operations concepts and tools
|
|
- Access to a test or lab environment for safe execution
|
|
- Python 3.8+ with required dependencies installed
|
|
- Appropriate authorization for any testing activities
|
|
|
|
## Instructions
|
|
|
|
Scan CI/CD workflow files for supply chain risks by parsing GitHub Actions YAML,
|
|
checking for unpinned dependencies, script injection vectors, and secrets exposure.
|
|
|
|
```python
|
|
import yaml
|
|
from pathlib import Path
|
|
|
|
for wf in Path(".github/workflows").glob("*.yml"):
|
|
with open(wf) as f:
|
|
workflow = yaml.safe_load(f)
|
|
for job_name, job in workflow.get("jobs", {}).items():
|
|
for step in job.get("steps", []):
|
|
uses = step.get("uses", "")
|
|
if uses and "@" in uses and not uses.split("@")[1].startswith("sha"):
|
|
print(f"Unpinned action: {uses} in {wf.name}")
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
Key supply chain risks:
|
|
1. Unpinned GitHub Actions (using @main instead of SHA)
|
|
2. Script injection via ${{ github.event }} expressions
|
|
3. Overly permissive GITHUB_TOKEN permissions
|
|
4. Third-party actions with write access to repo
|
|
5. Dependency confusion via public/private package name collision
|
|
|
|
## Examples
|
|
|
|
```python
|
|
# Check for script injection in run steps
|
|
for step in job.get("steps", []):
|
|
run_cmd = step.get("run", "")
|
|
if "${{" in run_cmd and "github.event" in run_cmd:
|
|
print(f"Script injection risk: {run_cmd[:80]}")
|
|
```
|