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Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/skills/hunting-for-scheduled-task-persistence/SKILL.md
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Mahipal 2fb6a9faff Rewrite 548 skill descriptions to the activation rubric
Each rewritten description now states both what the skill does (concrete
capability, named tools/artifacts) and an explicit when-to-use trigger,
improving agent discovery/activation. Grounded in each skill's own body;
changes confined to the `description` field only (bodies and all other
frontmatter untouched). Produced by a gated audit->rewrite->recheck loop
(548 -> 0 flagged) with a sampled anti-invention check (0 ungrounded).

Schema: 817/817 pass. Framework-ID gate: 0 defects.
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---
name: hunting-for-scheduled-task-persistence
description: Runs a hypothesis-driven threat hunt for Windows Scheduled Task persistence (T1053), guiding SIEM/EDR queries against task creation events (e.g. Event ID 4698), suspicious task actions, and unusual scheduling patterns. Use when hunting for scheduled-task persistence, after threat intel flags related campaigns, during incident response, or when alerts fire on schtasks/at.exe activity.
domain: cybersecurity
subdomain: threat-hunting
tags:
- threat-hunting
- mitre-attack
- scheduled-tasks
- persistence
- t1053
- proactive-detection
version: '1.0'
author: mahipal
license: Apache-2.0
d3fend_techniques:
- Execution Isolation
- Process Termination
- Hardware-based Process Isolation
- Platform Monitoring
- Process Suspension
nist_csf:
- DE.CM-01
- DE.AE-02
- DE.AE-07
- ID.RA-05
mitre_attack:
- T1046
- T1057
- T1082
- T1083
- T1547
---
# Hunting For Scheduled Task Persistence
## When to Use
- When proactively hunting for indicators of hunting for scheduled task persistence in the environment
- After threat intelligence indicates active campaigns using these techniques
- During incident response to scope compromise related to these techniques
- When EDR or SIEM alerts trigger on related indicators
- During periodic security assessments and purple team exercises
## Prerequisites
- EDR platform with process and network telemetry (CrowdStrike, MDE, SentinelOne)
- SIEM with relevant log data ingested (Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel)
- Sysmon deployed with comprehensive configuration
- Windows Security Event Log forwarding enabled
- Threat intelligence feeds for IOC correlation
## Workflow
1. **Formulate Hypothesis**: Define a testable hypothesis based on threat intelligence or ATT&CK gap analysis.
2. **Identify Data Sources**: Determine which logs and telemetry are needed to validate or refute the hypothesis.
3. **Execute Queries**: Run detection queries against SIEM and EDR platforms to collect relevant events.
4. **Analyze Results**: Examine query results for anomalies, correlating across multiple data sources.
5. **Validate Findings**: Distinguish true positives from false positives through contextual analysis.
6. **Correlate Activity**: Link findings to broader attack chains and threat actor TTPs.
7. **Document and Report**: Record findings, update detection rules, and recommend response actions.
## Key Concepts
| Concept | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| T1053.005 | Scheduled Task |
| T1053.003 | Cron |
| T1053.002 | At |
## Tools & Systems
| Tool | Purpose |
|------|---------|
| CrowdStrike Falcon | EDR telemetry and threat detection |
| Microsoft Defender for Endpoint | Advanced hunting with KQL |
| Splunk Enterprise | SIEM log analysis with SPL queries |
| Elastic Security | Detection rules and investigation timeline |
| Sysmon | Detailed Windows event monitoring |
| Velociraptor | Endpoint artifact collection and hunting |
| Sigma Rules | Cross-platform detection rule format |
## Common Scenarios
1. **Scenario 1**: Cobalt Strike persistence via schtasks creating periodic beacon
2. **Scenario 2**: Ransomware scheduled task for re-execution after reboot
3. **Scenario 3**: APT encoded PowerShell task running every 30 minutes
4. **Scenario 4**: Insider task to periodically copy sensitive files
## Output Format
```
Hunt ID: TH-HUNTIN-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Technique: T1053.005
Host: [Hostname]
User: [Account context]
Evidence: [Log entries, process trees, network data]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
Confidence: [High/Medium/Low]
Recommended Action: [Containment, investigation, monitoring]
```