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mukul975
105 lines
6.0 KiB
Markdown
105 lines
6.0 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: analyzing-threat-intelligence-feeds
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description: >
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Analyzes structured and unstructured threat intelligence feeds to extract actionable indicators,
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adversary tactics, and campaign context. Use when ingesting commercial or open-source CTI feeds,
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evaluating feed quality, normalizing data into STIX 2.1 format, or enriching existing IOCs with
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campaign attribution. Activates for requests involving ThreatConnect, Recorded Future, Mandiant
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Advantage, MISP, AlienVault OTX, or automated feed aggregation pipelines.
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domain: cybersecurity
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subdomain: threat-intelligence
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tags: [STIX, TAXII, MITRE-ATT&CK, IOC, ThreatConnect, Recorded-Future, MISP, CTI, NIST-CSF]
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version: 1.0.0
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author: mahipal
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license: Apache-2.0
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---
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# Analyzing Threat Intelligence Feeds
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## When to Use
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Use this skill when:
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- Ingesting new commercial or OSINT threat feeds and assessing their signal-to-noise ratio
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- Normalizing heterogeneous IOC formats (STIX 2.1, OpenIOC, YARA, Sigma) into a unified schema
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- Evaluating feed freshness, fidelity, and relevance to the organization's threat profile
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- Building automated enrichment pipelines that correlate IOCs against SIEM events
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**Do not use** this skill for raw packet capture analysis or live incident triage without first establishing a CTI baseline.
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## Prerequisites
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- Access to a Threat Intelligence Platform (TIP) such as ThreatConnect, MISP, or OpenCTI
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- API keys for at least one commercial feed (Recorded Future, Mandiant Advantage, or VirusTotal Enterprise)
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- TAXII 2.1 client library (taxii2-client Python package or equivalent)
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- Role with read/write permissions to the TIP's indicator database
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## Workflow
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### Step 1: Enumerate and Prioritize Feed Sources
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List all available feeds categorized by type (commercial, government, ISAC, OSINT):
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- Commercial: Recorded Future, Mandiant Advantage, CrowdStrike Falcon Intelligence
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- Government: CISA AIS (Automated Indicator Sharing), FBI InfraGard, MS-ISAC
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- OSINT: AlienVault OTX, Abuse.ch, PhishTank, Emerging Threats
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Score each feed on: update frequency, historical accuracy rate, coverage of your sector, and attribution depth. Use a weighted scoring matrix with criteria from NIST SP 800-150 (Guide to Cyber Threat Information Sharing).
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### Step 2: Ingest via TAXII 2.1 or API
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For TAXII-enabled feeds:
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```
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taxii2-client discover https://feed.example.com/taxii/
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taxii2-client get-collection --collection-id <id> --since 2024-01-01
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```
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For REST API feeds (e.g., Recorded Future):
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- Query `/v2/indicator/search` with `risk_score_min=65` to filter low-confidence IOCs
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- Apply rate limiting and exponential backoff for API resilience
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### Step 3: Normalize to STIX 2.1
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Convert each IOC to STIX 2.1 objects using the OASIS standard schema:
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- IP address → `indicator` object with `pattern: "[ipv4-addr:value = '...']"`
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- Domain → `indicator` with `pattern: "[domain-name:value = '...']"`
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- File hash → `indicator` with `pattern: "[file:hashes.SHA-256 = '...']"`
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Attach `relationship` objects linking indicators to `threat-actor` or `malware` objects. Use `confidence` field (0–100) based on source fidelity rating.
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### Step 4: Deduplicate and Enrich
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Run deduplication against existing TIP database using normalized value + type as composite key. Enrich surviving IOCs:
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- VirusTotal: detection ratio, sandbox behavior reports
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- PassiveTotal (RiskIQ): WHOIS history, passive DNS, SSL certificate chains
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- Shodan: banner data, open ports, geographic location
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### Step 5: Distribute to Consuming Systems
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Export enriched indicators via TAXII 2.1 push to SIEM (Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel), firewalls (Palo Alto XSOAR playbooks), and EDR platforms. Set TTL (time-to-live) per indicator type: IP addresses 30 days, domains 90 days, file hashes 1 year.
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## Key Concepts
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| Term | Definition |
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|------|-----------|
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| **STIX 2.1** | Structured Threat Information Expression — OASIS standard JSON schema for CTI objects including indicators, threat actors, campaigns, and relationships |
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| **TAXII 2.1** | Trusted Automated eXchange of Intelligence Information — HTTPS-based protocol for sharing STIX content between servers and clients |
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| **IOC** | Indicator of Compromise — observable artifact (IP, domain, hash, URL) that indicates a system may have been breached |
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| **TLP** | Traffic Light Protocol — color-coded classification (RED/AMBER/GREEN/WHITE) defining sharing restrictions for CTI |
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| **Confidence Score** | Numeric value (0–100 in STIX) reflecting the producer's certainty about an indicator's malicious attribution |
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| **Feed Fidelity** | Historical accuracy rate of a feed measured by true positive rate in production detections |
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## Tools & Systems
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- **ThreatConnect TC Exchange**: Aggregates 100+ commercial and OSINT feeds; provides automated playbooks for IOC enrichment
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- **MISP (Malware Information Sharing Platform)**: Open-source TIP supporting STIX/TAXII; widely used by ISACs and government CERTs
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- **OpenCTI**: Open-source platform with native MITRE ATT&CK integration and graph-based relationship visualization
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- **Recorded Future**: Commercial feed with AI-powered risk scoring and real-time dark web monitoring
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- **taxii2-client**: Python library for TAXII 2.0/2.1 client operations (pip install taxii2-client)
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- **PyMISP**: Python API for MISP feed management and IOC submission
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## Common Pitfalls
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- **IOC age staleness**: IP addresses and domains rotate frequently; applying 1-year-old IOCs generates false positives. Enforce TTL policies.
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- **Missing context**: Blocking an IOC without understanding the associated campaign or adversary can disrupt legitimate business traffic (e.g., CDN IPs shared with malicious actors).
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- **Feed overlap without deduplication**: Ingesting the same IOC from five feeds without deduplication inflates indicator counts and SIEM rule complexity.
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- **TLP violation**: Redistributing RED-classified intelligence outside authorized boundaries violates sharing agreements and trust relationships.
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- **Over-blocking on low-confidence indicators**: Indicators with confidence below 50 should trigger detection-only rules, not blocking, to avoid operational disruption.
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