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mukul975
efca3ec611
Mapped every skill to NIST CSF 2.0 subcategory IDs (GV/ID/PR/DE/RS/RC functions) based on subdomain and content analysis. Restores 11 skills corrupted during prior rebase, re-enriching with ATLAS, D3FEND, NIST AI RMF, and CSF 2.0 fields. All 754 skills now carry structured mappings for all 5 security frameworks: - MITRE ATT&CK (in tags) - MITRE ATLAS v5.5 (atlas_techniques) - MITRE D3FEND v1.3 (d3fend_techniques) - NIST AI RMF 1.0 (nist_ai_rmf) - NIST CSF 2.0 (nist_csf)
105 lines
3.6 KiB
Markdown
105 lines
3.6 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: configuring-hsm-for-key-storage
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description: Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) are tamper-resistant physical devices that safeguard cryptographic keys and
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perform cryptographic operations in a hardened environment. Keys stored in an HSM never lea
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domain: cybersecurity
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subdomain: cryptography
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tags:
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- cryptography
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- hsm
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- key-management
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- pkcs11
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- hardware-security
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version: '1.0'
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author: mahipal
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license: Apache-2.0
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nist_ai_rmf:
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- MEASURE-2.7
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- MAP-5.1
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- MANAGE-2.4
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atlas_techniques:
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- AML.T0070
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- AML.T0066
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- AML.T0082
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nist_csf:
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- PR.DS-01
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- PR.DS-02
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- PR.DS-10
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---
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# Configuring HSM for Key Storage
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## Overview
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Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) are tamper-resistant physical devices that safeguard cryptographic keys and perform cryptographic operations in a hardened environment. Keys stored in an HSM never leave the device boundary, providing the highest level of key protection. This skill covers configuring HSMs using the PKCS#11 standard interface, including key generation, signing, encryption, and key management using both physical HSMs and SoftHSM2 for development.
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## When to Use
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- When deploying or configuring configuring hsm for key storage capabilities in your environment
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- When establishing security controls aligned to compliance requirements
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- When building or improving security architecture for this domain
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- When conducting security assessments that require this implementation
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## Prerequisites
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- Familiarity with cryptography concepts and tools
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- Access to a test or lab environment for safe execution
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- Python 3.8+ with required dependencies installed
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- Appropriate authorization for any testing activities
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## Objectives
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- Configure SoftHSM2 as a development PKCS#11 provider
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- Generate and manage keys inside the HSM via PKCS#11
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- Perform cryptographic operations (sign, verify, encrypt, decrypt) using HSM-resident keys
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- Implement HSM-backed certificate authority operations
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- Configure key access policies and user authentication
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- Interface with cloud HSM services (AWS CloudHSM, Azure)
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## Key Concepts
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### HSM Compliance Levels
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| FIPS Level | Protection | Use Case |
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|-----------|-----------|----------|
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| FIPS 140-2 Level 1 | Software only | Development |
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| FIPS 140-2 Level 2 | Tamper-evident, role-based auth | General production |
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| FIPS 140-2 Level 3 | Tamper-resistant, identity-based auth | Financial, government |
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| FIPS 140-2 Level 4 | Physical tamper response | Military, classified |
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### PKCS#11 Architecture
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```
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Application --> PKCS#11 API --> HSM Provider --> Hardware HSM
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(SoftHSM2 for dev)
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```
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### Key Objects in PKCS#11
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| Object Type | Description | Operations |
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|-------------|-------------|-----------|
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| CKO_SECRET_KEY | Symmetric keys (AES) | Encrypt, Decrypt, Wrap |
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| CKO_PUBLIC_KEY | Public keys (RSA, EC) | Verify, Encrypt, Wrap |
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| CKO_PRIVATE_KEY | Private keys (RSA, EC) | Sign, Decrypt, Unwrap |
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| CKO_CERTIFICATE | X.509 certificates | Storage, retrieval |
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## Security Considerations
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- Never export private keys from HSM (use CKA_EXTRACTABLE=False)
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- Use separate slots/partitions for different applications
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- Implement multi-person key ceremony for CA root keys
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- Enable audit logging for all HSM operations
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- Implement HSM backup and disaster recovery
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- Use strong PINs and enable SO (Security Officer) PIN
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## Validation Criteria
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- [ ] SoftHSM2 initializes with token and user PIN
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- [ ] AES key generates inside HSM
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- [ ] RSA key pair generates inside HSM
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- [ ] Encryption/decryption uses HSM-resident keys
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- [ ] Signing/verification uses HSM-resident keys
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- [ ] Keys cannot be exported (non-extractable)
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- [ ] Key listing shows all HSM-stored objects
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