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Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/skills/auditing-kubernetes-rbac-privilege-escalation/references/api-reference.md
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mukul975 8cae0648ec Add 55 new skills across 3 new domains + 6 undercovered areas (762 -> 817)
Demand-driven expansion targeting the fastest-growing 2025-2026 threat and
skills categories (ISC2/WEF/CrowdStrike/Mandiant signals):

- AI Security (NEW domain, 12 skills): LLM red-teaming with garak/PyRIT,
  prompt injection (direct/indirect/RAG), MCP tool-poisoning, agentic tool
  invocation, guardrails, model/data poisoning, system-prompt leakage,
  embedding/vector weaknesses, model extraction, continuous red-teaming
- Supply Chain Security (NEW domain, 5 skills): SBOMs, dependency confusion,
  malicious-npm triage, typosquatting, SLSA/Sigstore provenance
- Hardware & Firmware Security (NEW domain, 4 skills): CHIPSEC/UEFI audit,
  Secure Boot bypass, TPM measured-boot attestation, ESP bootkit hunting
- Identity (10): Entra ID/ROADtools, GraphRunner, AADInternals, ADCS/Certipy,
  shadow credentials, coercion, BloodHound CE, device-code phishing, SSO abuse
- Cloud-native (8): Stratus, Pacu, CloudFox, container escape, K8s RBAC,
  Falco, Trivy, kube-bench
- Offensive C2 (6): Sliver, Havoc, NetExec, DPAPI, NTLM relay ESC8, redirectors
- DFIR (6): Hayabusa, Chainsaw, KAPE, Velociraptor, EZ Tools, Plaso
- Backfill (4): OpenCTI, MISP, honeytokens, post-quantum crypto migration

Each skill follows the repo taxonomy (SKILL.md + references/{standards,api-reference}.md
+ scripts/agent.py + LICENSE), with researched real tool commands (no placeholders),
complete frontmatter, and ATT&CK/ATLAS + NIST CSF mappings. Updates README domain
table, skill count, and index.json.
2026-06-22 19:08:16 +02:00

2.7 KiB

Kubernetes RBAC Audit — Command Reference

kubectl auth can-i

Command Purpose
kubectl auth can-i --list List all permissions for the current identity
kubectl auth can-i --list --as=system:serviceaccount:NS:SA List permissions for a service account (impersonation)
kubectl auth can-i <verb> <resource> Check a single permission
kubectl auth can-i <verb> <resource> --all-namespaces Check across namespaces
kubectl auth can-i '*' '*' Check for wildcard god-mode
--as-group=<group> Impersonate a group (e.g. system:masters)

kubectl-who-can (krew: who-can)

Command Purpose
kubectl who-can create pods List subjects that can create pods
kubectl who-can get secrets -n NS Subjects that can read secrets in a namespace
kubectl who-can '*' '*' Subjects with full wildcard access
kubectl who-can create serviceaccounts/token Token-minting subjects

rakkess / access-matrix (krew: access-matrix)

Command Purpose
kubectl access-matrix Verb x resource matrix for current subject
kubectl access-matrix --as system:serviceaccount:NS:SA Matrix for another subject
kubectl access-matrix resource pods Who can do what on pods (resource subcommand)

rbac-lookup (krew: rbac-lookup)

Command Purpose
kubectl rbac-lookup <name> Show roles bound to a subject
kubectl rbac-lookup <sa> --kind serviceaccount Filter to service accounts
kubectl rbac-lookup --output wide Include the source binding

rbac-police

Command Purpose
rbac-police eval ./lib/policies/ Run all escalation policies against the live cluster
rbac-police eval <policy.rego> -f json -o out.json Run one policy, JSON output
rbac-police collect -o snapshot.json Snapshot RBAC for offline analysis
rbac-police eval ./lib/policies/ --collect-results snapshot.json Evaluate from a snapshot
--severity-threshold High Filter to high-severity findings

Dangerous Verbs / Resources

Verb Sensitive Resources
escalate roles, clusterroles
bind clusterroles
impersonate users, groups, serviceaccounts
create/update/patch pods, deployments, daemonsets, mutatingwebhookconfigurations
create pods/exec, pods/attach, pods/ephemeralcontainers, serviceaccounts/token
get/list/watch secrets
approve certificatesigningrequests/approval

External References