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Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/skills/auditing-kubernetes-rbac-privilege-escalation/references/api-reference.md
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mukul975 8cae0648ec Add 55 new skills across 3 new domains + 6 undercovered areas (762 -> 817)
Demand-driven expansion targeting the fastest-growing 2025-2026 threat and
skills categories (ISC2/WEF/CrowdStrike/Mandiant signals):

- AI Security (NEW domain, 12 skills): LLM red-teaming with garak/PyRIT,
  prompt injection (direct/indirect/RAG), MCP tool-poisoning, agentic tool
  invocation, guardrails, model/data poisoning, system-prompt leakage,
  embedding/vector weaknesses, model extraction, continuous red-teaming
- Supply Chain Security (NEW domain, 5 skills): SBOMs, dependency confusion,
  malicious-npm triage, typosquatting, SLSA/Sigstore provenance
- Hardware & Firmware Security (NEW domain, 4 skills): CHIPSEC/UEFI audit,
  Secure Boot bypass, TPM measured-boot attestation, ESP bootkit hunting
- Identity (10): Entra ID/ROADtools, GraphRunner, AADInternals, ADCS/Certipy,
  shadow credentials, coercion, BloodHound CE, device-code phishing, SSO abuse
- Cloud-native (8): Stratus, Pacu, CloudFox, container escape, K8s RBAC,
  Falco, Trivy, kube-bench
- Offensive C2 (6): Sliver, Havoc, NetExec, DPAPI, NTLM relay ESC8, redirectors
- DFIR (6): Hayabusa, Chainsaw, KAPE, Velociraptor, EZ Tools, Plaso
- Backfill (4): OpenCTI, MISP, honeytokens, post-quantum crypto migration

Each skill follows the repo taxonomy (SKILL.md + references/{standards,api-reference}.md
+ scripts/agent.py + LICENSE), with researched real tool commands (no placeholders),
complete frontmatter, and ATT&CK/ATLAS + NIST CSF mappings. Updates README domain
table, skill count, and index.json.
2026-06-22 19:08:16 +02:00

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Markdown

# Kubernetes RBAC Audit — Command Reference
## kubectl auth can-i
| Command | Purpose |
|---------|---------|
| `kubectl auth can-i --list` | List all permissions for the current identity |
| `kubectl auth can-i --list --as=system:serviceaccount:NS:SA` | List permissions for a service account (impersonation) |
| `kubectl auth can-i <verb> <resource>` | Check a single permission |
| `kubectl auth can-i <verb> <resource> --all-namespaces` | Check across namespaces |
| `kubectl auth can-i '*' '*'` | Check for wildcard god-mode |
| `--as-group=<group>` | Impersonate a group (e.g. system:masters) |
## kubectl-who-can (krew: who-can)
| Command | Purpose |
|---------|---------|
| `kubectl who-can create pods` | List subjects that can create pods |
| `kubectl who-can get secrets -n NS` | Subjects that can read secrets in a namespace |
| `kubectl who-can '*' '*'` | Subjects with full wildcard access |
| `kubectl who-can create serviceaccounts/token` | Token-minting subjects |
## rakkess / access-matrix (krew: access-matrix)
| Command | Purpose |
|---------|---------|
| `kubectl access-matrix` | Verb x resource matrix for current subject |
| `kubectl access-matrix --as system:serviceaccount:NS:SA` | Matrix for another subject |
| `kubectl access-matrix resource pods` | Who can do what on pods (`resource` subcommand) |
## rbac-lookup (krew: rbac-lookup)
| Command | Purpose |
|---------|---------|
| `kubectl rbac-lookup <name>` | Show roles bound to a subject |
| `kubectl rbac-lookup <sa> --kind serviceaccount` | Filter to service accounts |
| `kubectl rbac-lookup --output wide` | Include the source binding |
## rbac-police
| Command | Purpose |
|---------|---------|
| `rbac-police eval ./lib/policies/` | Run all escalation policies against the live cluster |
| `rbac-police eval <policy.rego> -f json -o out.json` | Run one policy, JSON output |
| `rbac-police collect -o snapshot.json` | Snapshot RBAC for offline analysis |
| `rbac-police eval ./lib/policies/ --collect-results snapshot.json` | Evaluate from a snapshot |
| `--severity-threshold High` | Filter to high-severity findings |
## Dangerous Verbs / Resources
| Verb | Sensitive Resources |
|------|---------------------|
| `escalate` | roles, clusterroles |
| `bind` | clusterroles |
| `impersonate` | users, groups, serviceaccounts |
| `create`/`update`/`patch` | pods, deployments, daemonsets, mutatingwebhookconfigurations |
| `create` | pods/exec, pods/attach, pods/ephemeralcontainers, serviceaccounts/token |
| `get`/`list`/`watch` | secrets |
| `approve` | certificatesigningrequests/approval |
## External References
- Kubernetes RBAC Good Practices: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/rbac-good-practices/
- RBAC reference: https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/rbac/