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mukul975
cb8d79e068
- Add validated mitre_attack frontmatter to all 754 skills (286 distinct techniques), verified against MITRE ATT&CK v19.1 via the official mitreattack-python library: 0 revoked, deprecated, or invalid IDs - Curate precise per-skill technique IDs for forensics, malware-analysis, threat-intel, and red-team skills (e.g. DCSync -> T1003.006, Kerberoasting -> T1558.003, Pass-the-Ticket -> T1550.003) - Reconcile v19.1 tactic restructuring: Defense Evasion split into Stealth (TA0005) and Defense Impairment (TA0112); revoked T1562.* family and T1070.001/.002 remapped to active equivalents (T1685.*) - Normalize word-split tags across 35 skills (remove filename-derived stopword tags, add semantic cybersecurity tags) - Add api-reference.md for 3 skills that were missing it - Update README ATT&CK section with accurate v19.1 tactic distribution
103 lines
3.6 KiB
Markdown
103 lines
3.6 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: implementing-envelope-encryption-with-aws-kms
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description: Envelope encryption is a strategy where data is encrypted with a data
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encryption key (DEK), and the DEK itself is encrypted with a master key (KEK) managed
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by AWS KMS. This approach allows encrypting
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domain: cybersecurity
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subdomain: cryptography
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tags:
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- cryptography
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- encryption
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- aws
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- kms
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- envelope-encryption
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- key-management
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version: '1.0'
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author: mahipal
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license: Apache-2.0
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nist_csf:
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- PR.DS-01
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- PR.DS-02
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- PR.DS-10
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mitre_attack:
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- T1600
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- T1573
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- T1553
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- T1078.004
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- T1530
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---
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# Implementing Envelope Encryption with AWS KMS
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## Overview
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Envelope encryption is a strategy where data is encrypted with a data encryption key (DEK), and the DEK itself is encrypted with a master key (KEK) managed by AWS KMS. This approach allows encrypting large volumes of data locally while keeping the master key secure in a hardware security module (HSM) managed by AWS. This skill covers implementing envelope encryption using AWS KMS GenerateDataKey API.
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## When to Use
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- When deploying or configuring implementing envelope encryption with aws kms capabilities in your environment
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- When establishing security controls aligned to compliance requirements
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- When building or improving security architecture for this domain
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- When conducting security assessments that require this implementation
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## Prerequisites
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- Familiarity with cryptography concepts and tools
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- Access to a test or lab environment for safe execution
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- Python 3.8+ with required dependencies installed
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- Appropriate authorization for any testing activities
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## Objectives
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- Understand the envelope encryption pattern and its advantages
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- Generate data encryption keys using AWS KMS GenerateDataKey
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- Encrypt/decrypt data locally using DEKs
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- Store encrypted DEK alongside ciphertext
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- Implement key caching to reduce KMS API calls
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- Handle key rotation with automatic re-encryption
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- Implement multi-region encryption for disaster recovery
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## Key Concepts
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### Envelope Encryption Flow
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1. Call `kms:GenerateDataKey` to get plaintext DEK + encrypted DEK
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2. Use plaintext DEK to encrypt data locally (AES-256-GCM)
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3. Store encrypted DEK alongside ciphertext
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4. Discard plaintext DEK from memory
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5. For decryption: call `kms:Decrypt` on encrypted DEK, then decrypt data
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### Advantages Over Direct KMS Encryption
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| Aspect | Direct KMS | Envelope Encryption |
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|--------|-----------|-------------------|
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| Max data size | 4 KB | Unlimited |
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| Latency | Network round-trip per operation | Local encryption |
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| Cost | $0.03/10,000 requests | Fewer KMS requests |
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| Offline | Not possible | Yes (with cached DEKs) |
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### KMS Key Types
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- **AWS Managed**: AWS creates and manages (`aws/s3`, `aws/ebs`)
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- **Customer Managed**: You create and manage policies
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- **Custom Key Store**: Backed by CloudHSM cluster
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## Security Considerations
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- Never store plaintext DEK; only keep encrypted DEK
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- Use key policies to restrict who can call GenerateDataKey and Decrypt
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- Enable AWS CloudTrail logging for all KMS API calls
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- Implement key rotation (automatic annual rotation for CMKs)
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- Use encryption context for authenticated encryption metadata
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- Handle KMS throttling with exponential backoff
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## Validation Criteria
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- [ ] GenerateDataKey returns plaintext and encrypted DEK
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- [ ] Data encrypts correctly with plaintext DEK using AES-256-GCM
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- [ ] Encrypted DEK can be decrypted via KMS Decrypt API
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- [ ] Decrypted DEK recovers the original data
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- [ ] Plaintext DEK is wiped from memory after use
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- [ ] Encryption context is validated during decryption
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- [ ] Key rotation re-encrypts DEKs with new master key
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