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mukul975
cb8d79e068
- Add validated mitre_attack frontmatter to all 754 skills (286 distinct techniques), verified against MITRE ATT&CK v19.1 via the official mitreattack-python library: 0 revoked, deprecated, or invalid IDs - Curate precise per-skill technique IDs for forensics, malware-analysis, threat-intel, and red-team skills (e.g. DCSync -> T1003.006, Kerberoasting -> T1558.003, Pass-the-Ticket -> T1550.003) - Reconcile v19.1 tactic restructuring: Defense Evasion split into Stealth (TA0005) and Defense Impairment (TA0112); revoked T1562.* family and T1070.001/.002 remapped to active equivalents (T1685.*) - Normalize word-split tags across 35 skills (remove filename-derived stopword tags, add semantic cybersecurity tags) - Add api-reference.md for 3 skills that were missing it - Update README ATT&CK section with accurate v19.1 tactic distribution
91 lines
4.1 KiB
Markdown
91 lines
4.1 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: analyzing-active-directory-acl-abuse
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description: Detect dangerous ACL misconfigurations in Active Directory using ldap3
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to identify GenericAll, WriteDACL, and WriteOwner abuse paths
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domain: cybersecurity
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subdomain: identity-security
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tags:
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- active-directory
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- acl-abuse
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- ldap
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- privilege-escalation
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version: '1.0'
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author: mahipal
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license: Apache-2.0
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nist_csf:
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- PR.AA-01
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- PR.AA-05
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- PR.AA-06
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mitre_attack:
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- T1098
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- T1098.007
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- T1484.001
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- T1222.001
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- T1078.002
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---
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# Analyzing Active Directory ACL Abuse
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## Overview
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Active Directory Access Control Lists (ACLs) define permissions on AD objects through Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs) containing Access Control Entries (ACEs). Misconfigured ACEs can grant non-privileged users dangerous permissions such as GenericAll (full control), WriteDACL (modify permissions), WriteOwner (take ownership), and GenericWrite (modify attributes) on sensitive objects like Domain Admins groups, domain controllers, or GPOs.
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This skill uses the ldap3 Python library to connect to a Domain Controller, query objects with their nTSecurityDescriptor attribute, parse the binary security descriptor into SDDL (Security Descriptor Definition Language) format, and identify ACEs that grant dangerous permissions to non-administrative principals. These misconfigurations are the basis for ACL-based attack paths discovered by tools like BloodHound.
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## When to Use
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- When investigating security incidents that require analyzing active directory acl abuse
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- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
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- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
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- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
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## Prerequisites
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- Python 3.9 or later with ldap3 library (`pip install ldap3`)
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- Domain user credentials with read access to AD objects
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- Network connectivity to Domain Controller on port 389 (LDAP) or 636 (LDAPS)
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- Understanding of Active Directory security model and SDDL format
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## Steps
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1. **Connect to Domain Controller**: Establish an LDAP connection using ldap3 with NTLM or simple authentication. Use LDAPS (port 636) for encrypted connections in production.
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2. **Query target objects**: Search the target OU or entire domain for objects including users, groups, computers, and OUs. Request the `nTSecurityDescriptor`, `distinguishedName`, `objectClass`, and `sAMAccountName` attributes.
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3. **Parse security descriptors**: Convert the binary nTSecurityDescriptor into its SDDL string representation. Parse each ACE in the DACL to extract the trustee SID, access mask, and ACE type (allow/deny).
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4. **Resolve SIDs to principals**: Map security identifiers (SIDs) to human-readable account names using LDAP lookups against the domain. Identify well-known SIDs for built-in groups.
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5. **Check for dangerous permissions**: Compare each ACE's access mask against dangerous permission bitmasks: GenericAll (0x10000000), WriteDACL (0x00040000), WriteOwner (0x00080000), GenericWrite (0x40000000), and WriteProperty for specific extended rights.
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6. **Filter non-admin trustees**: Exclude expected administrative trustees (Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, SYSTEM, Administrators) and flag ACEs where non-privileged users or groups hold dangerous permissions.
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7. **Map attack paths**: For each finding, document the potential attack chain (e.g., GenericAll on user allows password reset, WriteDACL on group allows adding self to group).
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8. **Generate remediation report**: Output a JSON report with all dangerous ACEs, affected objects, non-admin trustees, and recommended remediation steps.
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## Expected Output
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```json
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{
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"domain": "corp.example.com",
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"objects_scanned": 1247,
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"dangerous_aces_found": 8,
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"findings": [
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{
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"severity": "critical",
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"target_object": "CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com",
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"target_type": "group",
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"trustee": "CORP\\helpdesk-team",
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"permission": "GenericAll",
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"access_mask": "0x10000000",
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"ace_type": "ACCESS_ALLOWED",
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"attack_path": "GenericAll on Domain Admins group allows adding arbitrary members",
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"remediation": "Remove GenericAll ACE for helpdesk-team on Domain Admins"
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}
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]
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}
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```
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