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mukul975
cb8d79e068
- Add validated mitre_attack frontmatter to all 754 skills (286 distinct techniques), verified against MITRE ATT&CK v19.1 via the official mitreattack-python library: 0 revoked, deprecated, or invalid IDs - Curate precise per-skill technique IDs for forensics, malware-analysis, threat-intel, and red-team skills (e.g. DCSync -> T1003.006, Kerberoasting -> T1558.003, Pass-the-Ticket -> T1550.003) - Reconcile v19.1 tactic restructuring: Defense Evasion split into Stealth (TA0005) and Defense Impairment (TA0112); revoked T1562.* family and T1070.001/.002 remapped to active equivalents (T1685.*) - Normalize word-split tags across 35 skills (remove filename-derived stopword tags, add semantic cybersecurity tags) - Add api-reference.md for 3 skills that were missing it - Update README ATT&CK section with accurate v19.1 tactic distribution
116 lines
4.3 KiB
Markdown
116 lines
4.3 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: detecting-lateral-movement-with-splunk
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description: Detect adversary lateral movement across networks using Splunk SPL queries
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against Windows authentication logs, SMB traffic, and remote service abuse.
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domain: cybersecurity
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subdomain: threat-hunting
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tags:
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- threat-hunting
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- mitre-attack
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- lateral-movement
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- splunk
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- siem
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- proactive-detection
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- ta0008
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version: '1.0'
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author: mahipal
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license: Apache-2.0
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d3fend_techniques:
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- Application Protocol Command Analysis
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- Network Isolation
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- Network Traffic Analysis
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- Client-server Payload Profiling
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- Network Traffic Community Deviation
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nist_csf:
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- DE.CM-01
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- DE.AE-02
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- DE.AE-07
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- ID.RA-05
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mitre_attack:
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- T1046
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- T1057
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- T1082
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- T1083
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- T1021
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---
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# Detecting Lateral Movement with Splunk
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## When to Use
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- When hunting for adversary movement between compromised systems
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- After detecting credential theft to trace subsequent lateral activity
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- When investigating unusual authentication patterns across the network
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- During incident response to scope the breadth of compromise
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- When proactively hunting for TA0008 (Lateral Movement) techniques
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## Prerequisites
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- Splunk Enterprise or Splunk Cloud with Windows event data ingested
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- Windows Security Event Logs forwarded (4624, 4625, 4648, 4672, 4768, 4769)
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- Sysmon deployed for process creation and network connection data
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- Network flow data or firewall logs for SMB/RDP/WinRM correlation
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- Active Directory user and group membership reference data
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## Workflow
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1. **Define Lateral Movement Scope**: Identify which lateral movement techniques to hunt (RDP, SMB/Admin Shares, WinRM, PsExec, WMI, DCOM, SSH).
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2. **Query Authentication Events**: Use SPL to search for Type 3 (Network) and Type 10 (RemoteInteractive) logons across the environment.
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3. **Build Authentication Graphs**: Map source-to-destination authentication relationships to identify unusual connection patterns.
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4. **Detect First-Time Relationships**: Identify new source-destination pairs that have not been seen in the historical baseline.
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5. **Correlate with Process Activity**: Link authentication events to subsequent process creation on destination hosts.
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6. **Identify Anomalous Patterns**: Flag lateral movement to sensitive servers, unusual hours, service account misuse, or rapid multi-host access.
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7. **Report and Contain**: Document lateral movement path, affected systems, and coordinate containment response.
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## Key Concepts
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| Concept | Description |
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|---------|-------------|
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| T1021 | Remote Services (parent technique) |
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| T1021.001 | Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) |
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| T1021.002 | SMB/Windows Admin Shares |
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| T1021.003 | Distributed COM (DCOM) |
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| T1021.004 | SSH |
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| T1021.006 | Windows Remote Management (WinRM) |
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| T1570 | Lateral Tool Transfer |
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| T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation |
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| T1569.002 | Service Execution (PsExec) |
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| Logon Type 3 | Network logon (SMB, WinRM, mapped drives) |
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| Logon Type 10 | Remote Interactive (RDP) |
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| Event ID 4624 | Successful logon |
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| Event ID 4648 | Explicit credential logon (runas, PsExec) |
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## Tools & Systems
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| Tool | Purpose |
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|------|---------|
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| Splunk Enterprise | SIEM for log aggregation and SPL queries |
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| Splunk Enterprise Security | Threat detection and notable events |
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| Windows Event Forwarding | Centralize Windows logs |
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| Sysmon | Detailed process and network telemetry |
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| BloodHound | AD attack path analysis |
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| PingCastle | AD security assessment |
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## Common Scenarios
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1. **PsExec Lateral Movement**: Adversary uses PsExec to execute commands on remote systems via SMB, generating Type 3 logon with ADMIN$ share access.
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2. **RDP Pivoting**: Attacker RDPs to internal systems using stolen credentials, creating Type 10 logon events.
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3. **WMI Remote Execution**: Adversary uses WMIC process call create to spawn processes on remote hosts.
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4. **WinRM PowerShell Remoting**: Attacker uses Enter-PSSession or Invoke-Command to execute code on remote systems.
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5. **Pass-the-Hash via SMB**: Compromised NTLM hashes used to authenticate to remote systems without knowing the plaintext password.
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## Output Format
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```
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Hunt ID: TH-LATMOV-[DATE]-[SEQ]
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Movement Type: [RDP/SMB/WinRM/WMI/DCOM/PsExec]
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Source Host: [Hostname/IP]
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Destination Host: [Hostname/IP]
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Account Used: [Username]
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Logon Type: [3/10/other]
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First Seen: [Timestamp]
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Event Count: [Number of events]
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Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
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Lateral Movement Path: [A -> B -> C -> D]
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```
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