Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/skills/detecting-suspicious-oauth-application-consent/SKILL.md at 768ca51c8d331ab0bdcea8ffb31c9b99bb2c1839

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mukul975 cb8d79e068 Map all 754 skills to MITRE ATT&CK v19.1

- Add validated mitre_attack frontmatter to all 754 skills (286 distinct
  techniques), verified against MITRE ATT&CK v19.1 via the official
  mitreattack-python library: 0 revoked, deprecated, or invalid IDs
- Curate precise per-skill technique IDs for forensics, malware-analysis,
  threat-intel, and red-team skills (e.g. DCSync -> T1003.006,
  Kerberoasting -> T1558.003, Pass-the-Ticket -> T1550.003)
- Reconcile v19.1 tactic restructuring: Defense Evasion split into
  Stealth (TA0005) and Defense Impairment (TA0112); revoked T1562.*
  family and T1070.001/.002 remapped to active equivalents (T1685.*)
- Normalize word-split tags across 35 skills (remove filename-derived
  stopword tags, add semantic cybersecurity tags)
- Add api-reference.md for 3 skills that were missing it
- Update README ATT&CK section with accurate v19.1 tactic distribution

2026-06-01 12:13:29 +02:00

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Overview

Illicit consent grant attacks trick users into granting excessive permissions to malicious OAuth applications in Azure AD / Microsoft Entra ID. This skill uses the Microsoft Graph API to enumerate OAuth2 permission grants, analyze application permissions for overly broad scopes, review directory audit logs for consent events, and flag high-risk applications based on publisher verification status and permission scope.

When to Use

When investigating security incidents that require detecting suspicious oauth application consent
When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques

Prerequisites

Azure AD / Entra ID tenant with Global Reader or Security Reader role
Microsoft Graph API access with Application.Read.All, AuditLog.Read.All, Directory.Read.All
Python 3.9+ with msal, requests
App registration with client secret or certificate for authentication

Steps

Authenticate to Microsoft Graph using MSAL client credentials flow
Enumerate all OAuth2 permission grants via /oauth2PermissionGrants
List service principals and their assigned application permissions
Query directory audit logs for Consent to application events
Flag applications with high-risk scopes (Mail.Read, Files.ReadWrite.All, etc.)
Check publisher verification status for each application
Generate risk report with remediation recommendations

Expected Output

JSON report listing all OAuth apps with granted permissions, risk scores, unverified publishers, and suspicious consent patterns
Audit trail of consent grant events with user and IP details

2.4 KiB Raw Blame History

Detecting Suspicious OAuth Application Consent