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mukul975
cb8d79e068
- Add validated mitre_attack frontmatter to all 754 skills (286 distinct techniques), verified against MITRE ATT&CK v19.1 via the official mitreattack-python library: 0 revoked, deprecated, or invalid IDs - Curate precise per-skill technique IDs for forensics, malware-analysis, threat-intel, and red-team skills (e.g. DCSync -> T1003.006, Kerberoasting -> T1558.003, Pass-the-Ticket -> T1550.003) - Reconcile v19.1 tactic restructuring: Defense Evasion split into Stealth (TA0005) and Defense Impairment (TA0112); revoked T1562.* family and T1070.001/.002 remapped to active equivalents (T1685.*) - Normalize word-split tags across 35 skills (remove filename-derived stopword tags, add semantic cybersecurity tags) - Add api-reference.md for 3 skills that were missing it - Update README ATT&CK section with accurate v19.1 tactic distribution
66 lines
2.4 KiB
Markdown
66 lines
2.4 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: detecting-suspicious-oauth-application-consent
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description: Detect risky OAuth application consent grants in Azure AD / Microsoft
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Entra ID using Microsoft Graph API, audit logs, and permission analysis to identify
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illicit consent grant attacks.
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domain: cybersecurity
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subdomain: cloud-security
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tags:
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- OAuth
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- Azure-AD
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- Entra-ID
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- Microsoft-Graph
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- illicit-consent
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- cloud-security
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- application-permissions
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version: '1.0'
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author: mahipal
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license: Apache-2.0
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nist_csf:
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- PR.IR-01
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- ID.AM-08
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- GV.SC-06
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- DE.CM-01
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mitre_attack:
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- T1528
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- T1550.001
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- T1098.001
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- T1566.002
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---
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# Detecting Suspicious OAuth Application Consent
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## Overview
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Illicit consent grant attacks trick users into granting excessive permissions to malicious OAuth applications in Azure AD / Microsoft Entra ID. This skill uses the Microsoft Graph API to enumerate OAuth2 permission grants, analyze application permissions for overly broad scopes, review directory audit logs for consent events, and flag high-risk applications based on publisher verification status and permission scope.
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## When to Use
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- When investigating security incidents that require detecting suspicious oauth application consent
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- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
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- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
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- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
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## Prerequisites
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- Azure AD / Entra ID tenant with Global Reader or Security Reader role
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- Microsoft Graph API access with `Application.Read.All`, `AuditLog.Read.All`, `Directory.Read.All`
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- Python 3.9+ with `msal`, `requests`
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- App registration with client secret or certificate for authentication
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## Steps
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1. Authenticate to Microsoft Graph using MSAL client credentials flow
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2. Enumerate all OAuth2 permission grants via `/oauth2PermissionGrants`
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3. List service principals and their assigned application permissions
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4. Query directory audit logs for `Consent to application` events
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5. Flag applications with high-risk scopes (Mail.Read, Files.ReadWrite.All, etc.)
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6. Check publisher verification status for each application
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7. Generate risk report with remediation recommendations
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## Expected Output
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- JSON report listing all OAuth apps with granted permissions, risk scores, unverified publishers, and suspicious consent patterns
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- Audit trail of consent grant events with user and IP details
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