Files
Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/skills/building-threat-hunt-hypothesis-framework/SKILL.md
T
Mahipal 2fb6a9faff Rewrite 548 skill descriptions to the activation rubric
Each rewritten description now states both what the skill does (concrete
capability, named tools/artifacts) and an explicit when-to-use trigger,
improving agent discovery/activation. Grounded in each skill's own body;
changes confined to the `description` field only (bodies and all other
frontmatter untouched). Produced by a gated audit->rewrite->recheck loop
(548 -> 0 flagged) with a sampled anti-invention check (0 ungrounded).

Schema: 817/817 pass. Framework-ID gate: 0 defects.
2026-08-02 09:32:13 -07:00

96 lines
3.5 KiB
Markdown

---
name: building-threat-hunt-hypothesis-framework
description: Build a systematic threat-hunt workflow that turns threat intelligence and ATT&CK gap analysis into testable hypotheses, then executes and validates them via EDR/SIEM queries (CrowdStrike, Defender, Splunk, Elastic, Sysmon, Velociraptor, Sigma) and documents findings in a standardized hunt report. Use when planning or running a proactive threat hunt or scoping compromise from an intel- or anomaly-driven lead.
domain: cybersecurity
subdomain: threat-hunting
tags:
- threat-hunting
- methodology
- hypothesis
- threat-intelligence
- hunting-framework
- proactive-detection
version: '1.0'
author: mahipal
license: Apache-2.0
nist_csf:
- DE.CM-01
- DE.AE-02
- DE.AE-07
- ID.RA-05
mitre_attack:
- T1071
- T1059.001
- T1055
- T1547
---
# Building Threat Hunt Hypothesis Framework
## When to Use
- When proactively hunting for indicators of building threat hunt hypothesis framework in the environment
- After threat intelligence indicates active campaigns using these techniques
- During incident response to scope compromise related to these techniques
- When EDR or SIEM alerts trigger on related indicators
- During periodic security assessments and purple team exercises
## Prerequisites
- EDR platform with process and network telemetry (CrowdStrike, MDE, SentinelOne)
- SIEM with relevant log data ingested (Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel)
- Sysmon deployed with comprehensive configuration
- Windows Security Event Log forwarding enabled
- Threat intelligence feeds for IOC correlation
## Workflow
1. **Formulate Hypothesis**: Define a testable hypothesis based on threat intelligence or ATT&CK gap analysis.
2. **Identify Data Sources**: Determine which logs and telemetry are needed to validate or refute the hypothesis.
3. **Execute Queries**: Run detection queries against SIEM and EDR platforms to collect relevant events.
4. **Analyze Results**: Examine query results for anomalies, correlating across multiple data sources.
5. **Validate Findings**: Distinguish true positives from false positives through contextual analysis.
6. **Correlate Activity**: Link findings to broader attack chains and threat actor TTPs.
7. **Document and Report**: Record findings, update detection rules, and recommend response actions.
## Key Concepts
| Concept | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| TA0001 | Initial Access |
| TA0003 | Persistence |
| TA0008 | Lateral Movement |
| TA0010 | Exfiltration |
## Tools & Systems
| Tool | Purpose |
|------|---------|
| CrowdStrike Falcon | EDR telemetry and threat detection |
| Microsoft Defender for Endpoint | Advanced hunting with KQL |
| Splunk Enterprise | SIEM log analysis with SPL queries |
| Elastic Security | Detection rules and investigation timeline |
| Sysmon | Detailed Windows event monitoring |
| Velociraptor | Endpoint artifact collection and hunting |
| Sigma Rules | Cross-platform detection rule format |
## Common Scenarios
1. **Scenario 1**: Intelligence-driven hunt based on APT campaign report
2. **Scenario 2**: ATT&CK coverage gap analysis driving hypothesis creation
3. **Scenario 3**: Anomaly-driven hypothesis from UEBA alert investigation
4. **Scenario 4**: Situational awareness hunt based on industry sector threats
## Output Format
```
Hunt ID: TH-BUILDI-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Technique: TA0001
Host: [Hostname]
User: [Account context]
Evidence: [Log entries, process trees, network data]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
Confidence: [High/Medium/Low]
Recommended Action: [Containment, investigation, monitoring]
```