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https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.git
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mukul975
915ea611e5
Skills added: - implementing-privileged-access-workstation (IAM, PAW hardening) - detecting-suspicious-oauth-application-consent (cloud security, Graph API) - performing-hardware-security-module-integration (cryptography, PKCS#11) - analyzing-android-malware-with-apktool (malware analysis, androguard) - hunting-for-unusual-service-installations (threat hunting, T1543.003) - detecting-shadow-it-cloud-usage (cloud security, proxy/DNS log analysis) - performing-active-directory-forest-trust-attack (red team, impacket) - implementing-deception-based-detection-with-canarytoken (deception, Canary API) - analyzing-office365-audit-logs-for-compromise (cloud security, BEC detection) - hunting-for-startup-folder-persistence (threat hunting, T1547.001) Each skill includes SKILL.md, LICENSE, scripts/agent.py, references/api-reference.md
39 lines
1.8 KiB
Markdown
39 lines
1.8 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: analyzing-office365-audit-logs-for-compromise
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description: Parse Office 365 Unified Audit Logs via Microsoft Graph API to detect email forwarding rule creation, inbox delegation, suspicious OAuth app grants, and other indicators of account compromise.
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domain: cybersecurity
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subdomain: cloud-security
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tags: [Office365, Microsoft-Graph, audit-logs, email-compromise, inbox-rules, OAuth, BEC]
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version: "1.0"
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author: mahipal
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license: Apache-2.0
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---
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# Analyzing Office 365 Audit Logs for Compromise
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## Overview
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Business Email Compromise (BEC) attacks often leave traces in Office 365 audit logs: suspicious inbox rule creation, email forwarding to external addresses, mailbox delegation changes, and unauthorized OAuth application consent grants. This skill uses the Microsoft Graph API to query the Unified Audit Log, enumerate inbox rules across mailboxes, detect forwarding configurations, and identify compromised account indicators.
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## Prerequisites
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- Azure AD app registration with `AuditLog.Read.All`, `MailboxSettings.Read`, `Mail.Read` (application permissions)
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- Python 3.9+ with `msal`, `requests`
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- Client secret or certificate for authentication
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- Global Reader or Security Reader role
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## Steps
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1. Authenticate to Microsoft Graph using MSAL client credentials flow
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2. Query Unified Audit Log for suspicious operations (Set-Mailbox, New-InboxRule)
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3. Enumerate inbox rules across mailboxes and flag forwarding rules
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4. Detect mailbox delegation changes (Add-MailboxPermission)
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5. Identify OAuth consent grants to suspicious applications
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6. Check for suspicious sign-in patterns from audit logs
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7. Generate compromise indicator report with timeline
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## Expected Output
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- JSON report listing forwarding rules, delegation changes, OAuth grants, and suspicious audit events with risk scores
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- Timeline of compromise indicators with affected mailboxes
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