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37 lines
1.6 KiB
Markdown
37 lines
1.6 KiB
Markdown
# Kubernetes RBAC Workflows
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## Workflow 1: New Team Onboarding
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1. Create dedicated namespace for the team
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2. Create ResourceQuota and LimitRange for the namespace
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3. Create NetworkPolicy to isolate namespace traffic
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4. Design Roles based on team member personas (admin, developer, viewer)
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5. Create RoleBindings mapped to OIDC groups
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6. Create dedicated service accounts for CI/CD
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7. Test access with `kubectl auth can-i` for each persona
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8. Document namespace ownership and contact
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## Workflow 2: RBAC Audit
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1. List all ClusterRoleBindings: `kubectl get clusterrolebindings -o wide`
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2. Identify bindings to cluster-admin role
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3. Review each cluster-admin binding for necessity
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4. Check for wildcard permissions in custom roles
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5. Verify service accounts have minimum permissions
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6. Test pod escape scenarios (exec, privileged containers)
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7. Generate compliance report with findings
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## Workflow 3: Privilege Escalation Prevention
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1. Restrict who can create/modify Roles and RoleBindings
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2. Prevent escalate verb usage (only cluster-admin should have it)
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3. Block bind verb for non-admin users
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4. Prevent impersonate verb usage
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5. Use admission controllers (OPA Gatekeeper) for policy enforcement
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6. Monitor audit logs for RBAC modification attempts
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## Workflow 4: Service Account Hardening
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1. List all service accounts: `kubectl get sa --all-namespaces`
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2. Identify service accounts with ClusterRole bindings
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3. Remove unnecessary ClusterRoleBindings
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4. Set automountServiceAccountToken: false in namespace default SA
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5. Create per-application service accounts with minimum roles
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6. Use projected service account tokens with short expiry
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