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115 lines
6.1 KiB
Markdown
115 lines
6.1 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: managing-intelligence-lifecycle
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description: >
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Manages the end-to-end cyber threat intelligence lifecycle from planning and direction through
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collection, processing, analysis, dissemination, and feedback to ensure intelligence products
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meet stakeholder requirements and continuously improve. Use when establishing or maturing a CTI
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program, defining intelligence requirements with business stakeholders, or building feedback loops
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between intelligence consumers and producers. Activates for requests involving CTI program
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maturity, intelligence requirements, PIRs, or intelligence lifecycle management.
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domain: cybersecurity
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subdomain: threat-intelligence
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tags: [CTI, intelligence-lifecycle, PIR, NIST-SP-800-150, threat-intelligence-program, NIST-CSF]
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version: 1.0.0
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author: team-cybersecurity
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license: MIT
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---
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# Managing Intelligence Lifecycle
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## When to Use
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Use this skill when:
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- Establishing a formal CTI program and defining its operational model
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- Conducting quarterly intelligence requirements reviews with business stakeholders
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- Evaluating CTI program maturity against established frameworks (FIRST CTI-SIG maturity model)
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**Do not use** this skill for day-to-day IOC triage or incident-specific intelligence tasks — those use operational intelligence workflows, not lifecycle management.
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## Prerequisites
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- Executive sponsorship and defined CTI team structure (1+ dedicated analysts)
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- Stakeholder map identifying intelligence consumers (SOC, IR, executive team, vulnerability management)
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- Existing feed subscriptions or ISAC memberships for collection baseline
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- CTI platform (MISP, ThreatConnect, OpenCTI) for lifecycle management
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## Workflow
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### Step 1: Planning and Direction
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Define Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) with stakeholders:
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- Interview SOC leads, IR team, CISO, risk management, and product security
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- Document PIRs in structured format: "What is the current capability and intent of [threat actor] to attack [critical asset] using [technique]?"
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- Prioritize 5–10 PIRs for the quarter, reviewed monthly
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Example PIR: "Is ransomware group Cl0p currently targeting organizations in our sector using MoveIT or GoAnywhere vulnerabilities?"
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### Step 2: Collection Planning
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Map PIRs to required collection sources:
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- Technical sources: commercial feeds, TAXII, ISAC data, honeypot telemetry, darkweb monitoring
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- Human sources: vendor threat briefings, industry working groups, law enforcement partnerships
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- Internal sources: SIEM logs, EDR telemetry, phishing submission mailbox
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Document collection gaps and associated costs to fill them.
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### Step 3: Processing and Normalization
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Implement automated processing pipeline:
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- Ingest → normalize to STIX 2.1 → deduplicate → enrich → score confidence
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- Reject unverifiable or duplicate indicators before analysis
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- Tag all processed data with source, collection date, and expiration
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### Step 4: Analysis and Production
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Produce intelligence at three levels:
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- **Strategic**: Quarterly threat landscape report for executives; sector trends, geopolitical context
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- **Operational**: Weekly campaign reports for security leadership; active campaigns, adversary activity
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- **Tactical**: Daily IOC bulletins for SOC; actionable indicators with block/monitor recommendations
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Apply structured analytic techniques: Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH), Key Assumptions Check, Devil's Advocacy.
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### Step 5: Dissemination
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Match product format to audience:
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- Executives: 1-page PDF with risk ratings, business impact, recommended decisions
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- SOC analysts: SIEM-ready IOC list, Sigma rules, MISP events
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- Vulnerability management: CVE lists with EPSS scores and exploitation likelihood
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- IT/Security leadership: Full intelligence report with technical appendix
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Apply TLP classifications and distribution lists per product type.
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### Step 6: Feedback and Evaluation
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Collect feedback within 5 business days of dissemination:
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- Did the product address the PIR?
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- Was actionability sufficient?
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- What data was missing?
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Track metrics quarterly: PIR coverage rate, IOC true positive rate, time-to-disseminate, stakeholder satisfaction score (NPS or structured survey).
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## Key Concepts
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| Term | Definition |
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|------|-----------|
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| **PIR** | Priority Intelligence Requirement — specific, actionable question driving intelligence collection and analysis |
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| **Intelligence Lifecycle** | Six-phase iterative process: Planning → Collection → Processing → Analysis → Dissemination → Feedback |
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| **Strategic Intelligence** | Long-term threat trend analysis for executive decision-making; time horizon 6–24 months |
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| **Operational Intelligence** | Campaign-level analysis for security program decisions; time horizon 1–6 months |
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| **Tactical Intelligence** | Specific IOCs and TTPs for immediate detection and blocking; time horizon hours to days |
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| **FIRST CTI-SIG** | Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams — CTI Special Interest Group maturity model |
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## Tools & Systems
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- **ThreatConnect**: TIP with built-in intelligence lifecycle workflows, PIR tracking, and stakeholder reporting dashboards
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- **MISP**: Open-source TIP supporting intelligence lifecycle from collection through sharing
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- **OpenCTI**: Graph-based CTI platform with workflow management for intelligence products
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- **Recorded Future**: Commercial platform with structured intelligence reports aligned to the intelligence lifecycle
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## Common Pitfalls
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- **Collection without direction**: Ingesting every available feed without PIRs produces data overload and no actionable intelligence.
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- **Missing feedback loops**: Without structured feedback, CTI teams produce reports that don't meet stakeholder needs and lose organizational relevance.
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- **Tactical-only focus**: Overemphasis on IOC sharing neglects strategic intelligence that informs security investment and risk decisions.
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- **No metrics program**: Cannot demonstrate CTI program value without tracking detection contributions, true positive rates, and stakeholder satisfaction.
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- **Underfunded collection**: PIRs cannot be answered without appropriate collection sources; document and escalate gaps rather than producing low-confidence estimates.
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