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mukul975
efca3ec611
Mapped every skill to NIST CSF 2.0 subcategory IDs (GV/ID/PR/DE/RS/RC functions) based on subdomain and content analysis. Restores 11 skills corrupted during prior rebase, re-enriching with ATLAS, D3FEND, NIST AI RMF, and CSF 2.0 fields. All 754 skills now carry structured mappings for all 5 security frameworks: - MITRE ATT&CK (in tags) - MITRE ATLAS v5.5 (atlas_techniques) - MITRE D3FEND v1.3 (d3fend_techniques) - NIST AI RMF 1.0 (nist_ai_rmf) - NIST CSF 2.0 (nist_csf)
248 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
248 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: analyzing-windows-amcache-artifacts
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description: 'Parses and analyzes the Windows Amcache.hve registry hive to extract evidence of program execution, application
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installation, and driver loading for digital forensics investigations. Uses Eric Zimmerman''s AmcacheParser and Timeline
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Explorer for artifact extraction, SHA-1 hash correlation with threat intel, and timeline reconstruction. Activates for requests
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involving Amcache forensics, program execution evidence, Windows artifact analysis, or application compatibility cache investigation.
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'
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domain: cybersecurity
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subdomain: digital-forensics
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tags:
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- amcache
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- windows-forensics
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- program-execution
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- AmcacheParser
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- eric-zimmerman
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- timeline-analysis
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- DFIR
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version: 1.0.0
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author: mahipal
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license: Apache-2.0
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nist_csf:
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- RS.AN-01
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- RS.AN-03
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- DE.AE-02
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- RS.MA-01
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---
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# Analyzing Windows Amcache Artifacts
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## When to Use
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- Determining which programs have existed or executed on a Windows system during incident response
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- Correlating SHA-1 hashes from Amcache against known malware databases (VirusTotal, CIRCL, MISP)
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- Building an application installation and execution timeline for forensic investigations
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- Identifying deleted executables that leave traces in Amcache even after file removal
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- Investigating insider threats by documenting which portable or unauthorized applications were present
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- Analyzing driver loading history to detect rootkits or malicious kernel modules
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**Do not use** as sole proof of program execution. Amcache proves file existence and metadata registration, but ShimCache (AppCompatCache) and Prefetch provide stronger execution evidence. Use all three artifacts together for conclusive analysis.
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## Prerequisites
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- A forensic image or live triage copy of `C:\Windows\appcompat\Programs\Amcache.hve` (and associated `.LOG1`, `.LOG2` transaction logs)
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- Eric Zimmerman's AmcacheParser (`AmcacheParser.exe`) downloaded from https://ericzimmerman.github.io/
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- Eric Zimmerman's Timeline Explorer for viewing parsed CSV output
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- Optionally: Registry Explorer for manual hive inspection
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- A SHA-1 whitelist of known-good executables (e.g., NSRL hashset) for filtering
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- .NET 6+ runtime installed (required by current EZ tools)
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- Write access to an output directory for CSV results
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## Workflow
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### Step 1: Acquire the Amcache.hve File
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Extract the Amcache hive from a forensic image or live system:
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```powershell
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# From a live system (requires elevated privileges and raw copy tool)
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# Amcache.hve is locked by the system; use a raw disk copy tool
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# Option A: FTK Imager - mount image and navigate to:
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# C:\Windows\appcompat\Programs\Amcache.hve
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# Also collect: Amcache.hve.LOG1, Amcache.hve.LOG2
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# Option B: Using KAPE for automated triage collection
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kape.exe --tsource C: --tdest D:\Evidence\%m --target Amcache
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# Option C: From a mounted forensic image (E: = mounted image)
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copy "E:\Windows\appcompat\Programs\Amcache.hve" D:\Evidence\
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copy "E:\Windows\appcompat\Programs\Amcache.hve.LOG1" D:\Evidence\
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copy "E:\Windows\appcompat\Programs\Amcache.hve.LOG2" D:\Evidence\
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```
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Always collect the transaction log files (`.LOG1`, `.LOG2`) alongside the hive. AmcacheParser replays uncommitted transactions from these logs to recover the most complete data.
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### Step 2: Parse Amcache with AmcacheParser
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Run AmcacheParser against the acquired hive:
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```powershell
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# Basic parsing with CSV output
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AmcacheParser.exe -f "D:\Evidence\Amcache.hve" --csv "D:\Evidence\Output"
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# Parse with a SHA-1 whitelist to exclude known-good entries (NSRL)
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AmcacheParser.exe -f "D:\Evidence\Amcache.hve" -w "D:\Whitelists\nsrl_sha1.txt" --csv "D:\Evidence\Output"
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# Parse with a SHA-1 inclusion list (only show matches against known-bad hashes)
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AmcacheParser.exe -f "D:\Evidence\Amcache.hve" -b "D:\IOCs\malware_sha1.txt" --csv "D:\Evidence\Output"
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# Include deleted entries with high-precision timestamps
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AmcacheParser.exe -f "D:\Evidence\Amcache.hve" --csv "D:\Evidence\Output" -i --mp
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```
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AmcacheParser produces multiple CSV files in the output directory:
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| Output File | Contents |
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|-------------|----------|
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| `Amcache_AssociatedFileEntries.csv` | File entries with SHA-1 hashes, paths, sizes, and timestamps |
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| `Amcache_UnassociatedFileEntries.csv` | Orphaned file entries from older Amcache format |
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| `Amcache_ProgramEntries.csv` | Installed program metadata (name, publisher, version, install date) |
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| `Amcache_DeviceContainers.csv` | USB and device connection history |
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| `Amcache_DevicePnps.csv` | Plug-and-Play device driver information |
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| `Amcache_DriverBinaries.csv` | Loaded driver binaries with paths and hashes |
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### Step 3: Analyze File Entries for Suspicious Programs
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Open the `AssociatedFileEntries.csv` in Timeline Explorer and examine key columns:
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```
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Key columns to review:
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- ProgramId : Links file to its parent program entry
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- SHA1 : Hash for threat intel lookups
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- FullPath : Original file location on disk
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- FileSize : Size of the executable
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- FileKeyLastWriteTimestamp : When the Amcache entry was last updated
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- Name : File name
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- Publisher : Code signing publisher (blank = unsigned)
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- BinProductVersion : Version string from the PE header
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- LinkDate : PE compilation timestamp (useful for detecting timestomping)
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```
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Filter for suspicious indicators:
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```
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# In Timeline Explorer, apply these filters:
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# 1. Find unsigned executables (potentially malicious)
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Publisher column = (empty)
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# 2. Find executables from suspicious paths
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FullPath contains: \temp\, \appdata\, \downloads\, \public\, \programdata\
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# 3. Find executables with recent timestamps during incident window
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FileKeyLastWriteTimestamp between: 2026-03-15 00:00:00 and 2026-03-16 00:00:00
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# 4. Find executables with suspicious compilation dates (timestomping)
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LinkDate year < 2015 AND FileKeyLastWriteTimestamp year = 2026
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```
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### Step 4: Correlate SHA-1 Hashes with Threat Intelligence
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Extract SHA-1 hashes and check against malware databases:
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```powershell
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# Extract unique SHA-1 hashes from the parsed output
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# Using PowerShell to extract the SHA1 column
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Import-Csv "D:\Evidence\Output\Amcache_AssociatedFileEntries.csv" |
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Select-Object -ExpandProperty SHA1 -Unique |
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Where-Object { $_ -ne "" } |
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Out-File "D:\Evidence\Output\extracted_hashes.txt"
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# Check hashes against VirusTotal using vt-cli
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foreach ($hash in Get-Content "D:\Evidence\Output\extracted_hashes.txt") {
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vt file $hash --format json | Select-Object -Property meaningful_name, last_analysis_stats
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}
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# Check hashes against CIRCL hashlookup
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foreach ($hash in Get-Content "D:\Evidence\Output\extracted_hashes.txt") {
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Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "https://hashlookup.circl.lu/lookup/sha1/$hash"
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}
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# Cross-reference with NSRL to identify known-good vs. unknown
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# Unknown hashes that are not in NSRL warrant closer investigation
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```
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### Step 5: Analyze Program Entries for Unauthorized Installations
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Review the `ProgramEntries.csv` for software the attacker may have installed:
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```
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Key columns in ProgramEntries:
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- ProgramName : Display name of installed application
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- ProgramVersion : Version string
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- Publisher : Software publisher
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- InstallDate : When the program was installed
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- Source : Installation source (msi, exe, etc.)
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- UninstallKey : Registry uninstall path
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- PathsList : Installation directories
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```
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Look for:
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- Remote access tools (AnyDesk, TeamViewer, ngrok, Chisel)
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- Hacking tools (Mimikatz, PsExec, Cobalt Strike)
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- Tunneling utilities (plink, socat, WireGuard)
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- Programs installed during the incident window
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- Programs installed to non-standard locations
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### Step 6: Analyze Driver Binaries for Rootkit Evidence
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Review the `DriverBinaries.csv` for suspicious loaded drivers:
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```
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Key columns in DriverBinaries:
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- DriverName : Name of the driver
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- DriverInBox : Whether it shipped with Windows (false = third-party)
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- DriverSigned : Whether the driver has a valid signature
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- DriverTimeStamp : Compilation timestamp
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- Product : Product associated with the driver
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- ProductVersion : Driver version
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- SHA1 : Hash of the driver binary
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```
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Filter for `DriverInBox = false` and `DriverSigned = false` to find unsigned third-party drivers that may be rootkits or vulnerable drivers used in BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) attacks.
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### Step 7: Build a Timeline from Amcache Data
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Combine Amcache data with other artifacts for a comprehensive timeline:
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```powershell
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# Merge Amcache CSV with other EZ Tools output using Timeline Explorer
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# Load the following CSVs into Timeline Explorer:
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# - Amcache_AssociatedFileEntries.csv (file evidence)
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# - Amcache_ProgramEntries.csv (install evidence)
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# - Prefetch output from PECmd.exe (execution evidence)
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# - ShimCache output from AppCompatCacheParser.exe (execution evidence)
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# Sort all entries by timestamp to reconstruct the attack sequence
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# Timeline Explorer supports multi-file loading and column-based sorting
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# Export the combined timeline
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# File > Save to CSV > combined_timeline.csv
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```
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## Key Concepts
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| Term | Definition |
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|------|------------|
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| **Amcache.hve** | A Windows registry hive at `C:\Windows\appcompat\Programs\Amcache.hve` that stores metadata about applications, files, and drivers for application compatibility purposes |
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| **Associated File Entry** | An Amcache record linked to a specific program installation, containing file path, size, hash, and timestamps |
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| **Unassociated File Entry** | An orphaned Amcache record from an older format that is not linked to a program entry; common on Windows 7/8 systems |
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| **Program Entry** | Amcache record containing installation metadata: program name, version, publisher, install date, and uninstall key |
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| **SHA-1 Hash** | Cryptographic hash stored in Amcache for each registered file, enabling malware identification through threat intelligence lookups |
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| **LinkDate** | The PE compilation timestamp embedded in the executable header; discrepancy with file system timestamps may indicate timestomping |
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| **Transaction Logs** | `.LOG1` and `.LOG2` files containing uncommitted registry transactions that AmcacheParser replays for complete data recovery |
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| **NSRL (National Software Reference Library)** | NIST-maintained database of SHA-1 hashes for known commercial software, used as a whitelist to filter benign entries |
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## Verification
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- [ ] Amcache.hve and transaction logs (LOG1, LOG2) were collected from the forensic image
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- [ ] AmcacheParser produced all expected CSV output files without errors
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- [ ] SHA-1 hashes were extracted and checked against VirusTotal or CIRCL hashlookup
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- [ ] Unsigned executables in suspicious paths have been flagged for further analysis
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- [ ] Program entries show all software installations within the incident window
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- [ ] Driver binaries have been checked for unsigned or out-of-box entries
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- [ ] LinkDate vs. FileKeyLastWriteTimestamp comparison has been performed to detect timestomping
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- [ ] Amcache findings are correlated with Prefetch and ShimCache for execution confirmation
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- [ ] Final timeline integrates Amcache data with other forensic artifacts
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