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Mapped every skill to NIST CSF 2.0 subcategory IDs (GV/ID/PR/DE/RS/RC functions) based on subdomain and content analysis. Restores 11 skills corrupted during prior rebase, re-enriching with ATLAS, D3FEND, NIST AI RMF, and CSF 2.0 fields. All 754 skills now carry structured mappings for all 5 security frameworks: - MITRE ATT&CK (in tags) - MITRE ATLAS v5.5 (atlas_techniques) - MITRE D3FEND v1.3 (d3fend_techniques) - NIST AI RMF 1.0 (nist_ai_rmf) - NIST CSF 2.0 (nist_csf)
267 lines
10 KiB
Markdown
267 lines
10 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: building-incident-response-playbook
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description: 'Designs and documents structured incident response playbooks that define step-by-step procedures for specific
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incident types aligned with NIST SP 800-61r3 and SANS PICERL frameworks. Covers playbook structure, decision trees, escalation
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criteria, RACI matrices, and integration with SOAR platforms. Activates for requests involving IR playbook creation, incident
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response procedure documentation, response runbook development, or SOAR playbook design.
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'
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domain: cybersecurity
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subdomain: incident-response
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tags:
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- IR-playbook
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- runbook
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- NIST-800-61
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- SOAR-integration
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- response-procedures
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mitre_attack:
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- T1190
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- T1566
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- T1078
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version: 1.0.0
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author: mahipal
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license: Apache-2.0
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nist_csf:
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- RS.MA-01
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- RS.MA-02
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- RS.AN-03
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- RC.RP-01
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---
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# Building Incident Response Playbooks
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## When to Use
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- Establishing or maturing an incident response program from scratch
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- Documenting procedures for a new incident type after a novel attack
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- Automating response workflows in a SOAR platform (Cortex XSOAR, Splunk SOAR)
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- Preparing for compliance audits requiring documented IR procedures (SOC 2, PCI-DSS, HIPAA)
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- Conducting a gap analysis of existing IR capabilities against specific threat scenarios
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**Do not use** for one-time ad hoc investigations; playbooks are reusable procedure documents, not case-specific reports.
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## Prerequisites
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- Organizational risk assessment identifying top incident scenarios by likelihood and impact
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- NIST SP 800-61r3 or SANS PICERL framework adopted as the organizational IR standard
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- Asset inventory with business criticality ratings and data classification
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- RACI chart defining roles: Incident Commander, SOC analysts, system administrators, legal, communications
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- Existing detection capabilities inventory (SIEM rules, EDR detections, IDS signatures)
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- SOAR platform access if building automated playbooks
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## Workflow
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### Step 1: Select and Scope the Incident Type
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Define the specific scenario the playbook will address:
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- Identify the top incident types based on organizational risk assessment and historical data
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- Scope each playbook to a single incident type for clarity (do not combine unrelated scenarios)
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- Define trigger conditions that activate the playbook
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Common playbook types:
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```
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Priority Playbooks (build first):
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1. Ransomware incident response
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2. Phishing/credential compromise
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3. Business email compromise
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4. Malware infection
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5. Data breach/exfiltration
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6. DDoS attack
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7. Insider threat
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8. Account takeover
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9. Web application compromise
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10. Cloud infrastructure compromise
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```
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### Step 2: Define the Playbook Structure
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Every playbook should follow a consistent structure:
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```
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PLAYBOOK TEMPLATE
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━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
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1. Playbook Metadata
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- Name, version, owner, last review date
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- Trigger conditions
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- Severity criteria
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2. RACI Matrix
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- Who is Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, Informed for each step
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3. Detection & Triage
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- How the incident is detected
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- Initial triage checklist
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- Severity classification criteria
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4. Containment
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- Short-term containment actions
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- Long-term containment actions
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- Evidence preservation requirements
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5. Eradication
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- Root cause identification
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- Malware/threat removal steps
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- Verification procedures
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6. Recovery
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- System restoration steps
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- Validation criteria
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- Monitoring requirements post-recovery
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7. Post-Incident
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- Lessons learned meeting trigger
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- Report template
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- Detection improvement actions
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8. Communication
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- Internal notification matrix
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- External notification requirements (regulators, customers, law enforcement)
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- Status update cadence
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9. Appendices
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- Tool-specific procedures
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- Contact lists
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- Evidence collection checklists
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```
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### Step 3: Write Decision Trees and Escalation Criteria
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Define clear decision points with binary outcomes:
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```
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Detection Alert Received
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├── Is the alert a true positive?
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│ ├── YES → Classify severity
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│ │ ├── P1 (Critical) → Page incident commander, begin containment immediately
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│ │ ├── P2 (High) → Notify IR lead, begin investigation within 30 min
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│ │ ├── P3 (Medium) → Queue for investigation within 4 hours
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│ │ └── P4 (Low) → Document and investigate within 24 hours
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│ └── NO → Document as false positive, tune detection rule
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└── Cannot determine → Escalate to Tier 2 for deeper analysis
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```
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Escalation triggers:
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- Any P1 incident: Immediate escalation to IR lead and CISO
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- Data exfiltration confirmed: Legal counsel and privacy officer notified
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- Customer data involved: Customer notification process activated
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- Third-party involvement: Vendor security contact engaged
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- Law enforcement needed: General counsel authorizes before contact
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### Step 4: Define Specific Technical Procedures
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Write tool-specific instructions for each step (not generic guidance):
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```
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CONTAINMENT - Endpoint Isolation via CrowdStrike:
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1. Open Falcon Console > Hosts > Search for affected hostname
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2. Click on the host > Host Details
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3. Click "Contain Host" button in upper right
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4. Confirm isolation (host will only communicate with CrowdStrike cloud)
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5. Document containment action in incident ticket with timestamp
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6. Verify containment: Host should show "Contained" status badge
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CONTAINMENT - Block C2 Domain at DNS:
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1. SSH to DNS server: ssh admin@dns-primary.corp.local
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2. Add to block zone: echo "zone evil.com { type master; file /etc/bind/db.sinkhole; };" >> /etc/bind/named.conf.local
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3. Reload DNS: rndc reload
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4. Verify: dig @dns-primary evil.com (should resolve to sinkhole IP 10.0.0.99)
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5. Document blocked domain in incident ticket
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```
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### Step 5: Integrate with SOAR Platform
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Convert manual playbook steps into automated workflows:
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- Map each playbook step to a SOAR action (API call, script, human decision point)
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- Define automation boundaries (what runs automatically vs. what requires analyst approval)
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- Build enrichment automations for the triage phase
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- Create containment automations with approval gates for high-impact actions
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- Configure notification automations for stakeholder communication
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### Step 6: Test and Maintain the Playbook
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Validate the playbook through exercises and maintain currency:
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- Conduct tabletop exercises with the IR team walking through the playbook
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- Perform live-fire exercises simulating the incident type in a test environment
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- Review and update after every real incident that uses the playbook
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- Schedule quarterly reviews for accuracy of contact lists, tool procedures, and escalation paths
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- Track playbook metrics: mean time to contain, mean time to resolve, false positive rate
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## Key Concepts
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| Term | Definition |
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|------|------------|
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| **Playbook** | Documented, repeatable set of procedures for responding to a specific incident type |
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| **Runbook** | More granular than a playbook; step-by-step technical instructions for a specific task within a playbook |
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| **RACI Matrix** | Responsibility assignment chart defining who is Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, and Informed for each activity |
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| **Decision Tree** | Flowchart-based logic defining the response path based on binary conditions at each decision point |
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| **Escalation Criteria** | Predefined conditions that trigger notification of higher-level personnel or external parties |
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| **SOAR Playbook** | Automated workflow in a Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response platform executing playbook steps |
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## Tools & Systems
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- **Cortex XSOAR**: SOAR platform with visual playbook editor, 700+ integrations, and collaborative War Room
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- **Splunk SOAR**: SOAR platform integrated with Splunk ES, drag-and-drop playbook builder with 2,800+ automated actions
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- **TheHive**: Open-source incident response platform with case templates that function as playbook frameworks
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- **Confluence / GitLab Wiki**: Documentation platforms for maintaining human-readable playbook documents with version control
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- **Tines**: No-code security automation platform for building playbook workflows without programming
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## Common Scenarios
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### Scenario: Building a Phishing Response Playbook from Scratch
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**Context**: An organization with a 5-person SOC has no documented phishing response procedure. Analysts handle phishing reports inconsistently.
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**Approach**:
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1. Interview SOC analysts to document their current ad hoc process
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2. Define the trigger: user reports phishing email via abuse@ mailbox or phishing button
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3. Write triage steps: extract email headers, check sender reputation, analyze URLs/attachments in sandbox
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4. Define containment: quarantine email from all mailboxes, block sender domain, reset passwords if credentials entered
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5. Build SOAR automation: auto-extract IOCs from reported email, enrich via VirusTotal, create case in TheHive
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6. Test with simulated phishing email and measure response time improvement
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**Pitfalls**:
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- Writing overly generic procedures that don't reference specific tool interfaces or commands
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- Not including the communication plan for notifying users who received the phishing email
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- Forgetting to define the criteria for when a phishing report becomes a full incident investigation
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- Not versioning the playbook or scheduling regular review cycles
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## Output Format
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```
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INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAYBOOK
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============================
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Playbook Name: Phishing Incident Response
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Version: 2.1
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Owner: SOC Manager
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Last Reviewed: 2025-11-01
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Next Review: 2026-02-01
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Trigger: Phishing email reported via abuse@corp.com or phish button
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RACI MATRIX
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Activity | SOC L1 | SOC L2 | IR Lead | Legal | Comms
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Initial Triage | R | C | I | |
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Email Analysis | R | A | I | |
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Containment | | R | A | I |
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Credential Reset | | R | A | |
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User Notification | | C | A | | R
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Regulatory Notification | | | C | R | A
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Lessons Learned | C | C | R | I | I
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PROCEDURE STEPS
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[Detailed steps with tool-specific instructions]
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DECISION TREE
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[Flowchart logic]
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ESCALATION MATRIX
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[Conditions and contacts]
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METRICS
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Target MTTA: 15 minutes
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Target MTTC: 1 hour
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Target MTTR: 4 hours
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```
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