Files
Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/skills/detecting-suspicious-oauth-application-consent/references/api-reference.md
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mukul975 4d6d585285 Add 10 new cybersecurity skills with full folder anatomy
Skills added:
- implementing-privileged-access-workstation (IAM, PAW hardening)
- detecting-suspicious-oauth-application-consent (cloud security, Graph API)
- performing-hardware-security-module-integration (cryptography, PKCS#11)
- analyzing-android-malware-with-apktool (malware analysis, androguard)
- hunting-for-unusual-service-installations (threat hunting, T1543.003)
- detecting-shadow-it-cloud-usage (cloud security, proxy/DNS log analysis)
- performing-active-directory-forest-trust-attack (red team, impacket)
- implementing-deception-based-detection-with-canarytoken (deception, Canary API)
- analyzing-office365-audit-logs-for-compromise (cloud security, BEC detection)
- hunting-for-startup-folder-persistence (threat hunting, T1547.001)

Each skill includes SKILL.md, LICENSE, scripts/agent.py, references/api-reference.md
2026-03-11 00:47:03 +01:00

64 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown

# API Reference — Detecting Suspicious OAuth Application Consent
## Libraries Used
- **msal**: Microsoft Authentication Library — client credentials flow for Microsoft Graph
- **requests**: HTTP client for Graph API calls with pagination
## CLI Interface
```
python agent.py --tenant-id TENANT --client-id CLIENT --client-secret SECRET grants
python agent.py --tenant-id TENANT --client-id CLIENT --client-secret SECRET apps
python agent.py --tenant-id TENANT --client-id CLIENT --client-secret SECRET audit-logs
python agent.py --tenant-id TENANT --client-id CLIENT --client-secret SECRET full --days 30
```
## Core Functions
### `get_access_token(tenant_id, client_id, client_secret)` — MSAL client credentials auth
Uses `ConfidentialClientApplication.acquire_token_for_client()` with scope
`https://graph.microsoft.com/.default` to obtain a bearer token.
### `graph_get(token, endpoint, params)` — Paginated Graph API GET
Handles `@odata.nextLink` pagination. Returns aggregated `value` array.
### `enumerate_oauth_grants(token)` — List delegated permission grants
Calls `GET /oauth2PermissionGrants`. Parses scope strings, flags high-risk scopes.
### `list_service_principals(token)` — Enumerate apps with verification status
Calls `GET /servicePrincipals?$top=999`. Checks `verifiedPublisher` field.
### `query_consent_audit_logs(token, days)` — Consent event audit trail
Calls `GET /auditLogs/directoryAudits` filtered by `activityDisplayName eq 'Consent to application'`.
Returns user principal, IP, target app, and result.
### `analyze_risk(grants, service_principals)` — Risk scoring engine
Scoring: +15 per high-risk scope, +25 for unverified publisher, +20 for AllPrincipals consent.
Levels: CRITICAL >= 70, HIGH >= 50, MEDIUM >= 25, LOW < 25.
### `full_audit(token, days)` — Comprehensive consent audit
## Microsoft Graph Endpoints
| Endpoint | Method | Required Permission |
|----------|--------|-------------------|
| `/oauth2PermissionGrants` | GET | `Directory.Read.All` |
| `/servicePrincipals` | GET | `Application.Read.All` |
| `/auditLogs/directoryAudits` | GET | `AuditLog.Read.All` |
## High-Risk OAuth Scopes
Mail.Read, Mail.ReadWrite, Mail.Send, Files.ReadWrite.All, Files.Read.All,
User.ReadWrite.All, Directory.ReadWrite.All, Sites.ReadWrite.All,
Contacts.ReadWrite, MailboxSettings.ReadWrite, People.Read.All,
Calendars.ReadWrite, Notes.ReadWrite.All
## Risk Scoring
| Factor | Points |
|--------|--------|
| Each high-risk scope | +15 |
| Unverified publisher | +25 |
| Admin consent (AllPrincipals) | +20 |
## Dependencies
- `msal` >= 1.24.0
- `requests` >= 2.28.0
- Azure AD app registration with `Application.Read.All`, `AuditLog.Read.All`, `Directory.Read.All`