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https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.git
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4d6d585285
Skills added: - implementing-privileged-access-workstation (IAM, PAW hardening) - detecting-suspicious-oauth-application-consent (cloud security, Graph API) - performing-hardware-security-module-integration (cryptography, PKCS#11) - analyzing-android-malware-with-apktool (malware analysis, androguard) - hunting-for-unusual-service-installations (threat hunting, T1543.003) - detecting-shadow-it-cloud-usage (cloud security, proxy/DNS log analysis) - performing-active-directory-forest-trust-attack (red team, impacket) - implementing-deception-based-detection-with-canarytoken (deception, Canary API) - analyzing-office365-audit-logs-for-compromise (cloud security, BEC detection) - hunting-for-startup-folder-persistence (threat hunting, T1547.001) Each skill includes SKILL.md, LICENSE, scripts/agent.py, references/api-reference.md
64 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
64 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
# API Reference — Detecting Suspicious OAuth Application Consent
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## Libraries Used
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- **msal**: Microsoft Authentication Library — client credentials flow for Microsoft Graph
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- **requests**: HTTP client for Graph API calls with pagination
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## CLI Interface
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```
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python agent.py --tenant-id TENANT --client-id CLIENT --client-secret SECRET grants
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python agent.py --tenant-id TENANT --client-id CLIENT --client-secret SECRET apps
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python agent.py --tenant-id TENANT --client-id CLIENT --client-secret SECRET audit-logs
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python agent.py --tenant-id TENANT --client-id CLIENT --client-secret SECRET full --days 30
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```
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## Core Functions
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### `get_access_token(tenant_id, client_id, client_secret)` — MSAL client credentials auth
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Uses `ConfidentialClientApplication.acquire_token_for_client()` with scope
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`https://graph.microsoft.com/.default` to obtain a bearer token.
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### `graph_get(token, endpoint, params)` — Paginated Graph API GET
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Handles `@odata.nextLink` pagination. Returns aggregated `value` array.
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### `enumerate_oauth_grants(token)` — List delegated permission grants
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Calls `GET /oauth2PermissionGrants`. Parses scope strings, flags high-risk scopes.
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### `list_service_principals(token)` — Enumerate apps with verification status
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Calls `GET /servicePrincipals?$top=999`. Checks `verifiedPublisher` field.
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### `query_consent_audit_logs(token, days)` — Consent event audit trail
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Calls `GET /auditLogs/directoryAudits` filtered by `activityDisplayName eq 'Consent to application'`.
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Returns user principal, IP, target app, and result.
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### `analyze_risk(grants, service_principals)` — Risk scoring engine
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Scoring: +15 per high-risk scope, +25 for unverified publisher, +20 for AllPrincipals consent.
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Levels: CRITICAL >= 70, HIGH >= 50, MEDIUM >= 25, LOW < 25.
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### `full_audit(token, days)` — Comprehensive consent audit
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## Microsoft Graph Endpoints
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| Endpoint | Method | Required Permission |
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|----------|--------|-------------------|
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| `/oauth2PermissionGrants` | GET | `Directory.Read.All` |
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| `/servicePrincipals` | GET | `Application.Read.All` |
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| `/auditLogs/directoryAudits` | GET | `AuditLog.Read.All` |
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## High-Risk OAuth Scopes
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Mail.Read, Mail.ReadWrite, Mail.Send, Files.ReadWrite.All, Files.Read.All,
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User.ReadWrite.All, Directory.ReadWrite.All, Sites.ReadWrite.All,
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Contacts.ReadWrite, MailboxSettings.ReadWrite, People.Read.All,
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Calendars.ReadWrite, Notes.ReadWrite.All
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## Risk Scoring
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| Factor | Points |
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|--------|--------|
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| Each high-risk scope | +15 |
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| Unverified publisher | +25 |
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| Admin consent (AllPrincipals) | +20 |
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## Dependencies
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- `msal` >= 1.24.0
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- `requests` >= 2.28.0
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- Azure AD app registration with `Application.Read.All`, `AuditLog.Read.All`, `Directory.Read.All`
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