Mapped every skill to NIST CSF 2.0 subcategory IDs (GV/ID/PR/DE/RS/RC functions)
based on subdomain and content analysis. Restores 11 skills corrupted during
prior rebase, re-enriching with ATLAS, D3FEND, NIST AI RMF, and CSF 2.0 fields.
All 754 skills now carry structured mappings for all 5 security frameworks:
- MITRE ATT&CK (in tags)
- MITRE ATLAS v5.5 (atlas_techniques)
- MITRE D3FEND v1.3 (d3fend_techniques)
- NIST AI RMF 1.0 (nist_ai_rmf)
- NIST CSF 2.0 (nist_csf)
Detect OS credential dumping techniques targeting LSASS memory, SAM database, NTDS.dit, and cached credentials using EDR telemetry, Sysmon process access monitoring, and Windows security event correlation.
cybersecurity
threat-hunting
threat-hunting
credential-dumping
lsass
mitre-t1003
edr
mimikatz
ntds
sam-database
1.0
mahipal
Apache-2.0
Token Binding
Execution Isolation
File Metadata Consistency Validation
Restore Access
Application Protocol Command Analysis
DE.CM-01
DE.AE-02
DE.AE-07
ID.RA-05
Detecting T1003 Credential Dumping with EDR
When to Use
When hunting for credential theft activity in the environment
After compromise indicators suggest attacker has elevated privileges
When EDR alerts fire for LSASS access or suspicious process memory reads
During incident response to determine scope of credential compromise
When auditing LSASS protection controls (Credential Guard, RunAsPPL)
Prerequisites
EDR agent deployed with LSASS access monitoring (CrowdStrike, Defender for Endpoint, SentinelOne)
Sysmon Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) with LSASS-specific filters
Windows Security Event ID 4656/4663 (Object Access Auditing)
LSASS SACL auditing enabled (Windows 10+)
Registry auditing for SAM hive access
Workflow
Monitor LSASS Process Access: Track all processes opening handles to lsass.exe with suspicious access rights (PROCESS_VM_READ 0x0010, PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS 0x1FFFFF). Non-privileged or unusual processes accessing LSASS are strong indicators.
Detect Credential Dumping Tools: Hunt for known tool signatures -- Mimikatz (sekurlsa::logonpasswords), procdump.exe targeting LSASS, comsvcs.dll MiniDump, and Task Manager creating LSASS dumps.
Monitor NTDS.dit Access: Detect Volume Shadow Copy creation (vssadmin, wmic shadowcopy) followed by NTDS.dit file access, or ntdsutil.exe IFM creation.
Track SAM/SECURITY/SYSTEM Hive Access: Hunt for reg.exe save commands targeting SAM, SECURITY, and SYSTEM registry hives.
Detect DCSync Activity: Monitor for non-DC accounts requesting directory replication (Event 4662 with replication GUIDs).
Correlate with Lateral Movement: After credential dumping, attackers typically move laterally. Correlate credential access events with subsequent remote logon attempts.
Assess Impact: Determine which credentials were potentially compromised and initiate password resets.
Key Concepts
Concept
Description
T1003.001
LSASS Memory -- dumping credentials from LSASS process
T1003.002
Security Account Manager -- extracting local account hashes from SAM
T1003.003
NTDS -- extracting domain hashes from Active Directory database
T1003.004
LSA Secrets -- extracting service account passwords
DCSync -- replicating credentials from domain controller
Credential Guard
Virtualization-based isolation of LSASS secrets
RunAsPPL
Protected Process Light for LSASS
Detection Queries
Splunk -- LSASS Access Detection
index=sysmon EventCode=10
| where match(TargetImage, "(?i)lsass\.exe$")
| where GrantedAccess IN ("0x1FFFFF", "0x1F3FFF", "0x143A", "0x1F0FFF", "0x0040", "0x1010", "0x1410")
| where NOT match(SourceImage, "(?i)(csrss|lsass|svchost|MsMpEng|WmiPrvSE|taskmgr|procexp|SecurityHealthService)\.exe$")
| table _time Computer SourceImage SourceProcessId GrantedAccess CallTrace
Splunk -- Credential Dumping Tool Detection
index=sysmon EventCode=1
| where match(CommandLine, "(?i)(sekurlsa|lsadump|kerberos::list|crypto::certificates)")
OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)procdump.*-ma.*lsass")
OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)comsvcs\.dll.*MiniDump")
OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)ntdsutil.*\"ac i ntds\".*ifm")
OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)reg\s+save\s+hklm\\\\(sam|security|system)")
OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)vssadmin.*create\s+shadow")
| table _time Computer User Image CommandLine ParentImage
KQL -- Microsoft Defender for Endpoint
DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType in ("LsassAccess", "CredentialDumpingActivity")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName,
InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ActionType, AdditionalFields
| sort by Timestamp desc
Sigma Rule -- LSASS Credential Dumping
title:LSASS Memory Credential Dumping Attemptstatus:stablelogsource:product:windowscategory:process_accessdetection:selection:TargetImage|endswith:'\lsass.exe'GrantedAccess|contains:- '0x1FFFFF'- '0x1F3FFF'- '0x143A'- '0x0040'filter:SourceImage|endswith:- '\csrss.exe'- '\lsass.exe'- '\MsMpEng.exe'- '\svchost.exe'condition:selection and not filterlevel:criticaltags:- attack.credential_access- attack.t1003.001
Common Scenarios
Mimikatz sekurlsa: Direct LSASS memory reading via sekurlsa::logonpasswords to extract plaintext passwords, NTLM hashes, and Kerberos tickets.
ProcDump LSASS: procdump.exe -ma lsass.exe lsass.dmp creating a memory dump for offline credential extraction.
Comsvcs.dll MiniDump: rundll32.exe comsvcs.dll MiniDump [LSASS_PID] dump.bin full using a built-in Windows DLL for LSASS dumping.
NTDS.dit Extraction: Creating a Volume Shadow Copy and copying NTDS.dit + SYSTEM hive for offline domain hash extraction with secretsdump.
SAM Hive Export: reg save HKLM\SAM sam.save followed by reg save HKLM\SYSTEM system.save for local account hash extraction.
Task Manager Dump: Right-clicking LSASS in Task Manager to create a memory dump -- a legitimate tool abused for credential theft.
Output Format
Hunt ID: TH-CRED-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Host: [Hostname]
Dumping Method: [LSASS_Access/NTDS/SAM/DCSync]
Source Process: [Tool or process used]
Target: [LSASS/NTDS.dit/SAM/SECURITY]
Access Rights: [Granted access mask]
User Context: [Account performing the dump]
ATT&CK Technique: [T1003.00x]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium]
Credentials at Risk: [Scope assessment]