mirror of
https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.git
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Mapped every skill to NIST CSF 2.0 subcategory IDs (GV/ID/PR/DE/RS/RC functions) based on subdomain and content analysis. Restores 11 skills corrupted during prior rebase, re-enriching with ATLAS, D3FEND, NIST AI RMF, and CSF 2.0 fields. All 754 skills now carry structured mappings for all 5 security frameworks: - MITRE ATT&CK (in tags) - MITRE ATLAS v5.5 (atlas_techniques) - MITRE D3FEND v1.3 (d3fend_techniques) - NIST AI RMF 1.0 (nist_ai_rmf) - NIST CSF 2.0 (nist_csf)
157 lines
6.3 KiB
Markdown
157 lines
6.3 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: detecting-t1003-credential-dumping-with-edr
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description: Detect OS credential dumping techniques targeting LSASS memory, SAM database, NTDS.dit, and cached credentials
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using EDR telemetry, Sysmon process access monitoring, and Windows security event correlation.
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domain: cybersecurity
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subdomain: threat-hunting
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tags:
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- threat-hunting
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- credential-dumping
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- lsass
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- mitre-t1003
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- edr
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- mimikatz
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- ntds
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- sam-database
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version: '1.0'
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author: mahipal
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license: Apache-2.0
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d3fend_techniques:
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- Token Binding
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- Execution Isolation
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- File Metadata Consistency Validation
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- Restore Access
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- Application Protocol Command Analysis
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nist_csf:
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- DE.CM-01
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- DE.AE-02
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- DE.AE-07
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- ID.RA-05
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---
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# Detecting T1003 Credential Dumping with EDR
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## When to Use
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- When hunting for credential theft activity in the environment
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- After compromise indicators suggest attacker has elevated privileges
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- When EDR alerts fire for LSASS access or suspicious process memory reads
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- During incident response to determine scope of credential compromise
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- When auditing LSASS protection controls (Credential Guard, RunAsPPL)
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## Prerequisites
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- EDR agent deployed with LSASS access monitoring (CrowdStrike, Defender for Endpoint, SentinelOne)
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- Sysmon Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) with LSASS-specific filters
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- Windows Security Event ID 4656/4663 (Object Access Auditing)
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- LSASS SACL auditing enabled (Windows 10+)
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- Registry auditing for SAM hive access
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## Workflow
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1. **Monitor LSASS Process Access**: Track all processes opening handles to lsass.exe with suspicious access rights (PROCESS_VM_READ 0x0010, PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS 0x1FFFFF). Non-privileged or unusual processes accessing LSASS are strong indicators.
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2. **Detect Credential Dumping Tools**: Hunt for known tool signatures -- Mimikatz (sekurlsa::logonpasswords), procdump.exe targeting LSASS, comsvcs.dll MiniDump, and Task Manager creating LSASS dumps.
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3. **Monitor NTDS.dit Access**: Detect Volume Shadow Copy creation (vssadmin, wmic shadowcopy) followed by NTDS.dit file access, or ntdsutil.exe IFM creation.
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4. **Track SAM/SECURITY/SYSTEM Hive Access**: Hunt for reg.exe save commands targeting SAM, SECURITY, and SYSTEM registry hives.
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5. **Detect DCSync Activity**: Monitor for non-DC accounts requesting directory replication (Event 4662 with replication GUIDs).
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6. **Correlate with Lateral Movement**: After credential dumping, attackers typically move laterally. Correlate credential access events with subsequent remote logon attempts.
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7. **Assess Impact**: Determine which credentials were potentially compromised and initiate password resets.
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## Key Concepts
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| Concept | Description |
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|---------|-------------|
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| T1003.001 | LSASS Memory -- dumping credentials from LSASS process |
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| T1003.002 | Security Account Manager -- extracting local account hashes from SAM |
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| T1003.003 | NTDS -- extracting domain hashes from Active Directory database |
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| T1003.004 | LSA Secrets -- extracting service account passwords |
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| T1003.005 | Cached Domain Credentials -- extracting DCC2 hashes |
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| T1003.006 | DCSync -- replicating credentials from domain controller |
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| Credential Guard | Virtualization-based isolation of LSASS secrets |
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| RunAsPPL | Protected Process Light for LSASS |
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## Detection Queries
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### Splunk -- LSASS Access Detection
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```spl
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index=sysmon EventCode=10
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| where match(TargetImage, "(?i)lsass\.exe$")
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| where GrantedAccess IN ("0x1FFFFF", "0x1F3FFF", "0x143A", "0x1F0FFF", "0x0040", "0x1010", "0x1410")
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| where NOT match(SourceImage, "(?i)(csrss|lsass|svchost|MsMpEng|WmiPrvSE|taskmgr|procexp|SecurityHealthService)\.exe$")
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| table _time Computer SourceImage SourceProcessId GrantedAccess CallTrace
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```
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### Splunk -- Credential Dumping Tool Detection
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```spl
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index=sysmon EventCode=1
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| where match(CommandLine, "(?i)(sekurlsa|lsadump|kerberos::list|crypto::certificates)")
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OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)procdump.*-ma.*lsass")
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OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)comsvcs\.dll.*MiniDump")
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OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)ntdsutil.*\"ac i ntds\".*ifm")
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OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)reg\s+save\s+hklm\\\\(sam|security|system)")
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OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)vssadmin.*create\s+shadow")
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| table _time Computer User Image CommandLine ParentImage
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```
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### KQL -- Microsoft Defender for Endpoint
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```kql
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DeviceEvents
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| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
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| where ActionType in ("LsassAccess", "CredentialDumpingActivity")
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| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName,
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InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ActionType, AdditionalFields
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| sort by Timestamp desc
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```
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### Sigma Rule -- LSASS Credential Dumping
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```yaml
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title: LSASS Memory Credential Dumping Attempt
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status: stable
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logsource:
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product: windows
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category: process_access
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detection:
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selection:
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TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
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GrantedAccess|contains:
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- '0x1FFFFF'
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- '0x1F3FFF'
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- '0x143A'
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- '0x0040'
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filter:
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SourceImage|endswith:
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- '\csrss.exe'
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- '\lsass.exe'
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- '\MsMpEng.exe'
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- '\svchost.exe'
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condition: selection and not filter
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level: critical
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tags:
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- attack.credential_access
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- attack.t1003.001
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```
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## Common Scenarios
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1. **Mimikatz sekurlsa**: Direct LSASS memory reading via `sekurlsa::logonpasswords` to extract plaintext passwords, NTLM hashes, and Kerberos tickets.
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2. **ProcDump LSASS**: `procdump.exe -ma lsass.exe lsass.dmp` creating a memory dump for offline credential extraction.
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3. **Comsvcs.dll MiniDump**: `rundll32.exe comsvcs.dll MiniDump [LSASS_PID] dump.bin full` using a built-in Windows DLL for LSASS dumping.
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4. **NTDS.dit Extraction**: Creating a Volume Shadow Copy and copying NTDS.dit + SYSTEM hive for offline domain hash extraction with secretsdump.
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5. **SAM Hive Export**: `reg save HKLM\SAM sam.save` followed by `reg save HKLM\SYSTEM system.save` for local account hash extraction.
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6. **Task Manager Dump**: Right-clicking LSASS in Task Manager to create a memory dump -- a legitimate tool abused for credential theft.
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## Output Format
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```
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Hunt ID: TH-CRED-[DATE]-[SEQ]
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Host: [Hostname]
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Dumping Method: [LSASS_Access/NTDS/SAM/DCSync]
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Source Process: [Tool or process used]
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Target: [LSASS/NTDS.dit/SAM/SECURITY]
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Access Rights: [Granted access mask]
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User Context: [Account performing the dump]
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ATT&CK Technique: [T1003.00x]
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Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium]
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Credentials at Risk: [Scope assessment]
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```
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