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mukul975
8cae0648ec
Demand-driven expansion targeting the fastest-growing 2025-2026 threat and
skills categories (ISC2/WEF/CrowdStrike/Mandiant signals):
- AI Security (NEW domain, 12 skills): LLM red-teaming with garak/PyRIT,
prompt injection (direct/indirect/RAG), MCP tool-poisoning, agentic tool
invocation, guardrails, model/data poisoning, system-prompt leakage,
embedding/vector weaknesses, model extraction, continuous red-teaming
- Supply Chain Security (NEW domain, 5 skills): SBOMs, dependency confusion,
malicious-npm triage, typosquatting, SLSA/Sigstore provenance
- Hardware & Firmware Security (NEW domain, 4 skills): CHIPSEC/UEFI audit,
Secure Boot bypass, TPM measured-boot attestation, ESP bootkit hunting
- Identity (10): Entra ID/ROADtools, GraphRunner, AADInternals, ADCS/Certipy,
shadow credentials, coercion, BloodHound CE, device-code phishing, SSO abuse
- Cloud-native (8): Stratus, Pacu, CloudFox, container escape, K8s RBAC,
Falco, Trivy, kube-bench
- Offensive C2 (6): Sliver, Havoc, NetExec, DPAPI, NTLM relay ESC8, redirectors
- DFIR (6): Hayabusa, Chainsaw, KAPE, Velociraptor, EZ Tools, Plaso
- Backfill (4): OpenCTI, MISP, honeytokens, post-quantum crypto migration
Each skill follows the repo taxonomy (SKILL.md + references/{standards,api-reference}.md
+ scripts/agent.py + LICENSE), with researched real tool commands (no placeholders),
complete frontmatter, and ATT&CK/ATLAS + NIST CSF mappings. Updates README domain
table, skill count, and index.json.
2.2 KiB
2.2 KiB
SSO Token-Abuse Hunting — Data Source Reference
Microsoft Entra ID (Sentinel / Log Analytics) Tables
| Table | Description |
|---|---|
SigninLogs |
Interactive user sign-ins |
AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs |
Non-interactive sign-ins; common surface for replayed cookies/refresh tokens |
AADServicePrincipalSignInLogs |
Service-principal sign-ins |
AuditLogs |
Directory changes incl. OAuth consent / permission grants |
AADManagedIdentitySignInLogs |
Managed-identity authentications |
Key correlation fields
| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
SessionId |
Linkable identifier joining all artifacts from one root auth event |
UniqueTokenIdentifier |
Per-token identifier; correlate issuance to usage |
IPAddress / LocationDetails |
Source IP and GeoIP for impossible-travel/ASN checks |
AppDisplayName / ResourceDisplayName |
Which SaaS app/resource the token accessed |
ConditionalAccessStatus |
Whether CA applied (notApplied can indicate replay) |
ResultType |
0 = success |
Okta System Log API
GET https://<org>.okta.com/api/v1/logs with header Authorization: SSWS <token>.
| Parameter | Description |
|---|---|
filter |
SCIM filter, e.g. eventType eq "policy.evaluate_sign_on" |
since / until |
ISO-8601 time bounds |
q |
Free-text search |
limit |
Page size |
Key event types and fields
| Item | Meaning |
|---|---|
user.session.start |
New session created |
policy.evaluate_sign_on |
Sign-on policy evaluation (per-access) |
authentication.sso |
SSO into a downstream app |
authenticationContext.externalSessionId |
Session identifier for reuse detection |
client.ipAddress / client.userAgent.rawUserAgent |
Source context for divergence checks |
actor.alternateId |
The user |
Response / Remediation
| Action | Command/API |
|---|---|
| Revoke Entra sessions | POST https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users/{id}/revokeSignInSessions |
| Clear Okta user sessions | DELETE https://<org>.okta.com/api/v1/users/{id}/sessions |
| Enforce token protection | Entra Conditional Access "Require token protection for sign-in sessions" |