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Demand-driven expansion targeting the fastest-growing 2025-2026 threat and
skills categories (ISC2/WEF/CrowdStrike/Mandiant signals):
- AI Security (NEW domain, 12 skills): LLM red-teaming with garak/PyRIT,
prompt injection (direct/indirect/RAG), MCP tool-poisoning, agentic tool
invocation, guardrails, model/data poisoning, system-prompt leakage,
embedding/vector weaknesses, model extraction, continuous red-teaming
- Supply Chain Security (NEW domain, 5 skills): SBOMs, dependency confusion,
malicious-npm triage, typosquatting, SLSA/Sigstore provenance
- Hardware & Firmware Security (NEW domain, 4 skills): CHIPSEC/UEFI audit,
Secure Boot bypass, TPM measured-boot attestation, ESP bootkit hunting
- Identity (10): Entra ID/ROADtools, GraphRunner, AADInternals, ADCS/Certipy,
shadow credentials, coercion, BloodHound CE, device-code phishing, SSO abuse
- Cloud-native (8): Stratus, Pacu, CloudFox, container escape, K8s RBAC,
Falco, Trivy, kube-bench
- Offensive C2 (6): Sliver, Havoc, NetExec, DPAPI, NTLM relay ESC8, redirectors
- DFIR (6): Hayabusa, Chainsaw, KAPE, Velociraptor, EZ Tools, Plaso
- Backfill (4): OpenCTI, MISP, honeytokens, post-quantum crypto migration
Each skill follows the repo taxonomy (SKILL.md + references/{standards,api-reference}.md
+ scripts/agent.py + LICENSE), with researched real tool commands (no placeholders),
complete frontmatter, and ATT&CK/ATLAS + NIST CSF mappings. Updates README domain
table, skill count, and index.json.
53 lines
2.2 KiB
Markdown
53 lines
2.2 KiB
Markdown
# SSO Token-Abuse Hunting — Data Source Reference
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## Microsoft Entra ID (Sentinel / Log Analytics) Tables
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| Table | Description |
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|-------|-------------|
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| `SigninLogs` | Interactive user sign-ins |
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| `AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs` | Non-interactive sign-ins; common surface for replayed cookies/refresh tokens |
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| `AADServicePrincipalSignInLogs` | Service-principal sign-ins |
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| `AuditLogs` | Directory changes incl. OAuth consent / permission grants |
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| `AADManagedIdentitySignInLogs` | Managed-identity authentications |
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### Key correlation fields
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| Field | Meaning |
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|-------|---------|
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| `SessionId` | Linkable identifier joining all artifacts from one root auth event |
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| `UniqueTokenIdentifier` | Per-token identifier; correlate issuance to usage |
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| `IPAddress` / `LocationDetails` | Source IP and GeoIP for impossible-travel/ASN checks |
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| `AppDisplayName` / `ResourceDisplayName` | Which SaaS app/resource the token accessed |
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| `ConditionalAccessStatus` | Whether CA applied (notApplied can indicate replay) |
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| `ResultType` | `0` = success |
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## Okta System Log API
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`GET https://<org>.okta.com/api/v1/logs` with header `Authorization: SSWS <token>`.
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| Parameter | Description |
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|-----------|-------------|
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| `filter` | SCIM filter, e.g. `eventType eq "policy.evaluate_sign_on"` |
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| `since` / `until` | ISO-8601 time bounds |
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| `q` | Free-text search |
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| `limit` | Page size |
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### Key event types and fields
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| Item | Meaning |
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|------|---------|
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| `user.session.start` | New session created |
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| `policy.evaluate_sign_on` | Sign-on policy evaluation (per-access) |
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| `authentication.sso` | SSO into a downstream app |
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| `authenticationContext.externalSessionId` | Session identifier for reuse detection |
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| `client.ipAddress` / `client.userAgent.rawUserAgent` | Source context for divergence checks |
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| `actor.alternateId` | The user |
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## Response / Remediation
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| Action | Command/API |
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|--------|-------------|
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| Revoke Entra sessions | `POST https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users/{id}/revokeSignInSessions` |
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| Clear Okta user sessions | `DELETE https://<org>.okta.com/api/v1/users/{id}/sessions` |
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| Enforce token protection | Entra Conditional Access "Require token protection for sign-in sessions" |
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